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For years, the law has grappled with the extent to which an individual
can consent to harmful physical contact. This has never been more evident than in the area of hazing. Courts have fallen on both sides of this
divide, often enough speculating about the mental state of the alleged hazing victim. The question is often whether the individual had the psychological wherewithal to resist situational or contextual demands placed on
him or her. In this Article, the authors provide clarity to how the law has
thought about this issue and how it should think about it in light of a
range of psychological theories and empirical research.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On November 19, 2011, Robert Champion, a twenty-six-year-old
clarinet player and drum major in Florida A&M University’s (FAMU)
Marching 100 band, collapsed on a charter bus parked outside an Orlando hotel, following a band performance at a football game between
1
FAMU and Bethune-Cookman. The Georgia native had become anxious, complaining of shortness of breath and failed eyesight, and had
2
apparently been vomiting before ultimately losing consciousness.
Champion was nonresponsive when authorities arrived at approximately
3
9:45 p.m. and was later pronounced dead at a nearby hospital. An initial emergency caller told the dispatcher that Champion had been vomit4
ing and that “[h]is eyes [were] open but [he was] not responding.” A
5
second caller told the dispatcher that Champion was “cold.”
By Tuesday, November 22, rumors had already circulated on the
FAMU campus and social media that hazing had played a part in
6
Champion’s death. Law enforcement officials also believed some form
7
of hazing to have occurred before the 911 emergency call was placed.
Ultimately, suspicions that hazing played a role in Champion’s death
were confirmed when Champion’s death was ruled a homicide by the
8
State Medical Examiner’s Office in Orlando. The medical examiner’s
office found that Champion’s death resulted from blunt-force trauma
suffered during a hazing incident involving some members of FAMU’s
9
Marching 100. Champion endured such severe blows during the inci-
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1. Freida Frisaro, Attorney Says Suit Planned in FAMU Band Death, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Nov. 25, 2011, available at NewsBank, Rec. No. D9R7V2NO0; Brent Kallestad, Fired
FAMU Band Director: Hazing Warnings Ignored, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 29, 2011, available at NewsBank, Rec. No. 0ef37ebd103d533dbf5020cbc498970b [hereinafter Kallestad, Hazing Warnings Ignored].
2. Paul Flemming, Autopsy: FAMU Drum Major Died Within One Hour of Hazing,
GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 22, 2011, available at ProQuest, Doc. No. 912380698; Autopsy: Fla. A&M Drum Major’s Death a Homicide, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 16, 2011,
available at ProQuest, Doc. No. 912012529 [hereinafter Autopsy].
3. Kallestad, Hazing Warnings Ignored, supra note 1.
4. Mike Schneider & Gary Fineout, Vomit in FAMU Student’s Mouth Before He Dies,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 1, 2011, available at NewsBank, Rec. No. c502d9622d494a9935508b
79be7f82eb.
5. Id.
6. Jordan Culver, Hazing Rumors Surround Death of Fla. Student, GANNETT NEWS
SERVICE, Nov. 22, 2011, available at ProQuest, Doc. No. 905839615.
7. Frisaro, supra note 1.
8. Flemming, supra note 2; Autopsy, supra note 2.
9. Autopsy, supra note 2.

34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 6 Side A

01/13/2014 11:22:05

PARKS 10 (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

11/25/2013 3:41 PM

HAZING CONSENT

3

dent that he bled out into his soft tissue, particularly in his back, chest,
10
shoulders, and arms. The autopsy further revealed that Champion had
been vomiting profusely and died within an hour of the time he suffered
11
the injuries. Toxicology tests revealed no traces of drugs or alcohol in
12
Champion’s system.
Immediately following Champion’s death, FAMU President James
Ammons suspended all of the Marching 100’s appearances and perfor13
mances, and the band’s immediate future became unclear. Four days
after Champion’s death, Ammons fired band director Julian White who
was later reinstated and placed on administrative leave after the Florida
Department of Law Enforcement requested that the university put a
hold on any disciplinary actions during its investigation into Champion’s
14
White argued that he had repeatedly tried to take
beating death.
measures against hazing within the FAMU Marching 100 and had not
15
been backed by the university’s administration. Ultimately, White retired when it was discovered that many of the Marching 100’s members
(three of whom were allegedly involved in Champion’s hazing death)
16
were not students at FAMU and were not enrolled in any band classes.
Several weeks later, Ammons suspended all of the Marching 100’s appearances and performances and addressed some 2,000 FAMU students,

01/13/2014 11:22:05
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10. Flemming, supra note 2; Mike Schneider, 13 Charged in Hazing Death of Fla. Band
Member, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 2, 2012, available at NewsBank, Rec. No. f6a3310a4251b0
62a27873387f42151f.
11. Flemming, supra note 2.
12. Id.
13. Culver, supra note 6; Schneider, supra note 10. Initially following Champion’s death,
Ammons vowed to convene an independent task force to investigate successful anti-hazing
policies at other colleges and universities and make recommendations as to how to eliminate
hazing on the FAMU campus. See FAMU President Postpones Work of Hazing Task Force,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 2, 2011, available at NewsBank, Rec. No. D9RC6CQO0. In December, however, Ammons decided to postpone the task force so that “the school could fully
cooperate with investigations by the Florida Board of Governors, Orange County Sheriff’s
Office and Florida Department of Law Enforcement.” Id. In February of 2012, the FAMU
Board of Trustees appointed seven experts to the independent task force. Jennifer Portman,
Florida A&M Selects Anti-Hazing Committee, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 9, 2012, available at ProQuest, Doc. No. 920882621.
14. Bill Cotterell, Gov. Scott Repeats Call for Florida A&M President to Step Aside,
GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 18, 2011, available at ProQuest, Doc. No. 912012484.
15. Frisaro, supra note 1; Kallestad, Hazing Warnings Ignored, supra note 1.
16. Gary Fineout, Florida A&M President Resigns in Wake of Scandal, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, July 12, 2012, available at NewsBank, Rec. No. 0d5debc3da823324c335e16f5261279b;
Jennifer Portman, 3 Charged in Hazing Death Were Not Enrolled at Florida A&M, GANNETT
NEWS SERVICE, May 8, 2012, available at ProQuest, Doc. No. 1011642906.
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reaffirming FAMU’s commitment to ending the “conspiracy of silence”
17
that surrounds hazing practices at the school. Petitions pledging to end
18
hazing were circulated throughout the audience.
Hazing within the FAMU Marching 100 is said to have begun as early as the 1950s and has generally been associated with entry into sub19
groups within the band rather than entry into the band itself. In 1998,
clarinet player Ivery Luckey was hospitalized after being hit approxi20
mately 300 times with a wooden paddle. Luckey’s beating occurred
21
during initiation into a band clique known as “The Clones.” Twenty or
so “band members were suspended, and Luckey sued the state Board of
22
Regents,” ultimately settling out of court. Three years later, Marcus
Parker was hospitalized after suffering kidney damage resultant from
23
being beaten with a wooden paddle.
On October 31, 2011, and November 1, 2011, just weeks before the
hazing incident that resulted in Champion’s death, Bria Shante Hunter
was beaten so severely during her initiation into the “Red Dawg Order,”
24
a band clique for Georgia natives, that she could barely walk. According to authorities, Hunter’s pain became so unbearable that she went to
the hospital where she was told she had a broken thighbone and blood
25
clots in her legs. Hunter was a freshman clarinet player and, like
Champion, a leader in the FAMU band and graduate from Southwest
26
DeKalb High School in Georgia. She was beaten in two separate inci27
dents. The first, she said, occurred when leaders of the Red Dawg Or28
der suspected that she was trying to get out of a group meeting. The
second incident occurred when she was unable to accurately answer

01/13/2014 11:22:05
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17. Culver, supra note 6; Brent Kallestad, FAMU Student Leaders Call for an End to
Hazing, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 6, 2011, available at NewsBank, Rec. No. D9REO17O0
[hereinafter Kallestad, FAMU Student Leaders].
18. Kallestad, FAMU Student Leaders, supra note 17.
19. Culver, supra note 6; Schneider, supra note 10.
20. Greg Bluestein & Gary Fineout, Attorney: FAMU Student Hazed Could Barely
Walk, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 13, 2011, available at NewsBank, Rec. No. D9RJTGMO0;
Frisaro, supra note 1; Kallestad, Hazing Warnings Ignored, supra note 1.
21. Bluestein & Fineout, supra note 20.
22. Frisaro, supra note 1.
23. Id.
24. Bluestein & Fineout, supra note 20; John Tkach, Three FAMU Band Members
Charged, USA TODAY, Dec. 13, 2011, at C11, available at ProQuest, Doc. No. 910500964.
25. Tkach, supra note 24.
26. Bluestein & Fineout, supra note 20.
27. Tkach, supra note 24.
28. Bluestein & Fineout, supra note 20.
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29

questions regarding the history of the clique. Both times, Hunter was
30
struck across the legs with fists, metal rulers, and notebook binders.
Asked why band members took part in hazing rituals, Hunter answered,
“[s]o we can be accepted . . . . If you don’t do anything, then, it’s like
31
you’re lame.” After Champion’s death, three band members were arrested and charged for Hunter’s beating, which occurred off-campus at
the apartment of James Harris who claimed to have, at one point,
32
stopped the other two men from beating Hunter. Harris was charged
33
with hazing. The other two men, nineteen-year-old Aaron Golson and
twenty-three-year-old Sean Hobson, were charged with hazing and bat34
tery.
The lawsuit against thirteen members of the famed FAMU March35
ing 100 described two kinds of hazing that took place on the bus. First,
in the ritual known as “Crossing Bus C,” students ran down the aisle
from the front of the bus to the back while other students stood on the
36
Students who fell were
sides beating, slapping, and kicking them.
kicked and stomped and then dragged back to the front of the bus to
37
start over. According to one witness, large band members positioned
themselves at the back of the bus to make the victim’s final steps the
38
most difficult. The other ritual, called “the hot seat,” involved a pillowcase being placed over the victim’s nose and mouth while he was
39
forced to answer questions. Correct answers garnered a moment of relief; incorrect answers meant another question with no chance to
40
breathe in between.
According to Champion’s friends and family, he was a strong oppo-
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29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Schneider, supra note 10.
36. David Ariosto, FAMU Pledges Reforms After Report on Hazing, CNN WIRE, Jan.
24, 2013, available at NewsBank, Rec. No. 1359053358; Kyle Hightower & Mike Schneider,
Band Mates Say FAMU Victim Volunteered to Be Hazed, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 23, 2012,
available at NewsBank, Rec. No. 90333c02d7e6ce06e77e129b20233957; Schneider, supra note
10.
37. Schneider, supra note 10.
38. Hightower & Schneider, supra note 36.
39. Schneider, supra note 10.
40. Id.
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41. Hightower & Schneider, supra note 36.
42. Blayne Alexander, Hazing Victim: ‘I Was Made an Example of,’ GANNETT NEWS
SERVICE, Dec. 14, 2011, available at NewsBank, Rec. No. 45904888.
43. Hightower & Schneider, supra note 36.
44. Ariosto, supra note 36; Hightower & Schneider, supra note 36.
45. Hightower & Schneider, supra note 36.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. ASSOCIATED PRESS, Florida: University Holds Drum Major Responsible for His
Death in Hazing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2012, at A21.
51. Id.

34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 7 Side B

nent of hazing within the Marching 100. His high school classmate and
mentee, Bria Hunter, said Champion told her not to let anyone touch
42
her. However, interviews with defendants and other band members released in late May suggested that Champion had volunteered to go
43
through the hazing rituals. Champion sought to be the leader of the
Marching 100, leading others who had already “Cross[ed] Bus C,” and
some band members felt that meant Champion had to go through with
44
the beating. According to defendant Caleb Jackson, “[i]f you go to
45
that bus that’s saying that you wanted to do it.”
Although band members sign a pledge vowing not to participate in
hazing, Champion and two other band members went through the ritual
46
on the night of his death. According to defendant Jonathan Boyce,
47
Champion said he intended to go through with it.
Ryan Dean, a
drummer who regularly rode Bus C, said that Champion told him earlier
48
in the week he would “see [them] on the bus.” According to Boyce,
“Champion was in the back[] getting kicked and punched” by the time
he arrived, and Boyce and co-defendant Shawn Turner tried to shield
Champion from the blows and get him to the back to end the ritual
49
quickly.
Ultimately, when Champion’s parents brought a lawsuit against
FAMU, the university, in its defense, insisted that it was Champion, not
the school, who bore the ultimate responsibility for his hazing death be50
cause he consented to the hazing activities. Arguing that the judge
should dismiss the lawsuit, the university argued that “[n]o public university or college has a legal duty to protect an adult student from the
result of their own decision to participate in a dangerous activity while
51
off-campus and after retiring from university-sponsored events.”
While Robert Champion’s hazing death is in the context of collegiate
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band initiation rites, it provides a recent example of the broader context
within which collegiate hazing often takes place—fraternities and sororities. Accordingly, in this Article, we explore whether fraternity and sorority pledges can consent to hazing. There has been some divergence
on the topic in the law. Most state hazing statutes have remained silent
52
on the issue, and only a few courts have squarely addressed the issue.
Among the latter, courts presume that the psychological will of the haz53
ing victim has been overborne. However, these cases provide little in
the way of engagement with psychological theory or research. As such,
in this Article, we investigate a range of psychological theories that may
explain why hazing victims persist in their hazing experiences. In Part
II, we explore how victims’ consent is addressed in criminal, tort, and
hazing case law and statutes. In Part III, we highlight several psychological theories which courts should consider when determining the extent
to which, if at all, a hazing victim’s psychological will has been overcome.
II. THE LAW OF CONSENT

A. Consent in Criminal Law: A General Approach
Consent in criminal law has undergone a shift in its approach to
rights and interests of the victim. Prior to the seventeenth century,
common law reflected the Roman law principle “‘volenti non fit injuria’

C M
Y K

See infra notes 133–35 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 177–78, 188–91 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra notes 139–41 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 136–38 and accompanying text.

01/13/2014 11:22:05

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
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This Part presents a brief summary of ways consent is viewed and
addressed in criminal, civil, and hazing statutes. Criminal law largely rejects consent as a defense in most cases, except in those areas of activity
54
deemed appropriate by courts. Civil law permits consent as a defense,
particularly where the victims assumed the risk of the activity in which
they were harmed, or the injury was a foreseeable risk of participating in
55
the activity. Hazing statutes often bar use of the victims’ consent as a
56
defense by making it irrelevant. Others explicitly bar the defense or
apply a presumption against consent or that hazing activity is per se
57
forced.
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(‘to a willing person, no injury is done’)” that allowed “individuals to
58
consent to harm-causing acts,” making consent a complete bar to pros59
ecution. During the 1600s, criminal systems shifted from interests in
the victims and their rights to a centralized judicial structure focused on
60
the public good. “[A]cts that had been considered violations of a particular victim’s interests came to be viewed as . . . a ‘disturbance of the
61
society,’” a view still echoed in today’s case law. This shift resulted in
the state becoming the “ultimate victim and the sole prosecutor of [the]
criminal act” and the removal of the actual victim from the criminal pro62
cess. As such, “an individual lost the power to consent to what the
63
state regarded as harm to itself.”
Much of the literature on consent in criminal law centers on cases
64
65
involving contact sports, sexual assault and rape, and sadomaso66
chism. Today, criminal law commonly rejects consent as a defense to
67
most criminal assaults. However, the Model Penal Code (MPC) and
other case law make exceptions “for assaults resulting in little or no in68
jury, sports, medical treatment, and body modification.” Even with
these exceptions, criminal law favors a public policy where “a person

01/13/2014 11:22:05
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58. Ryan G. Fischer et al., From the Legal Literature, 45 CRIM. L. BULL. 1137, 1145
(2009) (quoting Randolf v. de Richmond, Y.B. 33 Edw., fol. RS 7-11, Mich., pl. 6, at 6–9
(1305) (Eng.) (“to a willing man no injury is done”); Vera Bergelson, The Right to Be Hurt:
Testing the Boundaries of Consent, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 165, 171–72 (2007)).
59. Vera Bergelson, Consent to Harm, 28 PACE L. REV. 683, 686 (2008).
60. Id.; Fischer et al., supra note 58, at 1145.
61. Fischer et al., supra note 58, at 1145 (quoting Bergelson, supra note 58, at 172); see
also Bergelson, supra note 59, at 686.
62. Bergelson, supra note 59, at 686.
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., Christo Lassiter, Lex Sportiva: Thoughts Towards a Criminal Law of Competitive Contact Sport, 22 ST. JOHN’S J.L. COMMENT. 35, 55 (2007); Ben Livings, A Different
Ball Game—Why the Nature of Consent in Contact Sports Undermines a Unitary Approach,
71 J. CRIM. L. 534, 534 (2007); Jeffrey Standen, The Manly Sports: The Problematic Use of
Criminal Law to Regulate Sports Violence, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 619, 620–21
(2009).
65. See, e.g., Peter Westen, Some Common Confusions About Consent in Rape Cases, 2
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 333, 333 (2004).
66. See, e.g., Cheryl Hanna, Sex Is Not a Sport: Consent and Violence in Criminal Law,
42 B.C. L. REV. 239, 239 (2001).
67. Fischer et al., supra note 58, at 1145; see generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11
(1985).
68. Fischer et al., supra note 58, at 1139 (quoting Kelly Egan, Comment, Morality-Based
Legislation Is Alive and Well: Why the Law Permits Consent to Body Modification but Not
Sadomasochistic Sex, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1615, 1625 (2007)); see also MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.11(2).
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69. Fischer et al., supra note 58, at 1138 (quoting People v. Jovanovic, 700 N.Y.S.2d 156,
168 n.5 (App. Div. 1999)).
70. Fischer et al., supra note 58, at 1138, 1145–46.
71. Taylor v. State, 133 A.2d 414, 415 (Md. 1957).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Wright v. Starr, 179 P. 877, 878 (Nev. 1919).
75. State v. Fransua, 510 P.2d 106, 107 (N.M. Ct. App. 1973).
76. Bergelson, supra note 59, at 687 & n.29 (“Thirteen states explicitly recognize a general defense of consent in their statutes.”).
77. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(1) (1985); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE
CRIMINAL LAW § 6.5 (2d ed. 2003).

34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 9 Side A

cannot avoid criminal responsibility for an assault that causes injury or
carries a risk of serious harm, even if the victim asked for or consented
69
to the act.” Courts have often found that consent is not a valid defense
when criminal assaults are injurious to a person and constitute a breach
70
of public peace.
In Taylor v. State, the court divided criminal assault into two classes:
one that breaches the public peace generally and another that “is not accompanied by the threat of serious hurt or breach of the public peace,”
71
and “is treated as a crime against the person.” There, the court found
that there is no defense of consent when the criminal assault “tends to
bring about a breach of the public peace” because the crime is treated as
72
crime against the general public. However, where a criminal assault “is
not accompanied by the threat of serious hurt or breach of the public
peace . . . the consent of the person assaulted is held to be a good defense, since the absence of consent is an essential element of the of73
fense.”
The court in Wright v. Starr similarly noted that the law punishes for
criminal assault “even if consent is given . . . because consent to a battery is illegal as against the state, on account of the breach of public
74
peace involved.” Likewise, a New Mexico court favored the public’s
“stronger and overriding interest in preventing and prohibiting” violent
acts over victims of crimes who “have so little regard for their own safe75
ty as to request injury.”
The MPC’s view on consent serves as the basis for the law in the ma76
jority of states. “The consent of the victim to conduct charged to constitute an offense or to the result thereof is a defense if such consent
negatives an element of the offense or precludes the infliction of the
77
harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.”
For offenses that involve bodily harm, consent is not a defense even if it

34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 9 Side B

01/13/2014 11:22:05

PARKS 10 (DO NOT DELETE)

10

11/25/2013 3:41 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[97:1

78

C M
Y K

01/13/2014 11:22:05

78. Bergelson, supra note 59, at 687 (“This general rule, however, does not apply to offenses involving bodily harm.”).
79. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.11(2), 3.08(4)(a). See generally id. § 3 (providing justifications for conduct that would otherwise be a criminal offense).
80. Id. § 2.11(3).
81. See Livings, supra note 64, at 534.
82. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.0(3).
83. VERA BERGELSON, VICTIMS’ RIGHTS AND VICTIMS’ WRONGS: COMPARATIVE
LIABILITY IN CRIMINAL LAW 20 (2009).
84. Fischer et al., supra note 58, at 1147.
85. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11 cmt. n.8.

34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 9 Side B

negatives an element of the offense. Instead, consent is a defense to
conduct that “causes or threatens bodily injury,” or “the infliction of
such injury” under the MPC in specific instances: (1) when “the bodily
injury consented to or threatened by the conduct consented to is not serious;” (2) “the conduct and the injury are reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint participation in a lawful athletic contest or competitive
sport or other concerted activity not forbidden by law;” (3) the consent
establishes a justification such as protection of property and selfprotection; and (4) when bodily harm is inflicted for “a recognized form
79
of treatment” to improve a patient’s mental or physical health. Assent
does not constitute consent if: (1) the assenter is “legally incompetent to
authorize the conduct charged to constitute the offense;” (2) the assenter is “unable to make a reasonable judgment as to the nature or harmfulness of the conduct;” (3) “it is induced by force, duress or deception
of [the] kind” the law is trying to prevent; or (4) “it is given by a person
80
whose improvident consent” the law is trying to prevent.
Consent as a defense is viewed by some legal scholars as more permissible in certain contexts than in others, often based on the definition
81
and interpretation of a “serious” injury. Bodily injury is “serious” according to the MPC and similarly worded statutes if it “creates a substantial risk of death or . . . causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or
protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or
82
organ.” Bergelson posits that “courts habitually exaggerate the seriousness of injury or pain and the risk of death in order to condemn an
83
unwanted activity.” Courts seem more lenient in cases of religious
flagellation and serious injuries resulting from contact sports because of
84
the perceived social utility associated with such activities.
Commentary to MPC acknowledges that assessment of seriousness is
impacted by “moral judgments about the iniquity of the conduct in85
volved.” Courts also suggest “that there is a variance in the way that
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[offenses] are viewed within and [outside] the context of sport,” possibly
resulting in “a higher threshold that must be reached before liability is
86
imposed for [behavior] on the sports field.” In essence, if a harmful act
is not athletic or medical, it may be criminal unless the injury is not seri87
ous. Thus, determining seriousness of an injury, as well as the court’s
perception of the social utility of the activity in question, influences the
88
outcomes of cases involving consensual harm.
B. Consent in Civil Law: A General Approach
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86. Livings, supra note 64, at 541.
87. Bergelson, supra note 59, at 691.
88. See id.
89. Nancy J. Moore, Intent and Consent in the Tort of Battery: Confusion and Controversy, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1585, 1605 (2012) (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 13(a)
(1934)).
90. Moore, supra note 89, at 1605, 1612.
91. Id. at 1605 & n.112.
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A (1979).
93. See id. § 892A cmt. c, illus. 2; Moore, supra note 89, at 1646–49.
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The First Restatement of Torts defines the tort of battery as an act
with intent to bring about “a harmful or offensive contact,” without con89
sent or privilege. However, it was unclear from the First Restatement
whether lack of consent was an element of a prima facie case for battery,
and the corollary, whether consent was an affirmative defense to the
90
claim. The Second Restatement worked to resolve this ambiguity by
stating that when the defendant has a reasonable belief that the plaintiff
has consented to the act, the defendant has apparent consent and is
therefore entitled to a complete affirmative defense and is absolved of
91
liability.
The Second Restatement clearly establishes that one who consents
to an act “cannot recover . . . for the conduct or for harm resulting from
it”; furthermore, any consent only applies to the conduct it is specifically
related to, and any conduct beyond that covered by the consent can be
92
the basis for tort recovery. The evolution of the defense of consent in
battery torts has altered the role of consent as a successful defense, but
ambiguities still exist in the policy and contractual nature of provided
consent, which case law better illuminates.
The issue of consent is especially common in battery torts arising
93
from medical treatment. While additional issues of informed consent
and intent arise in these circumstances, the basic principles of consent
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94. Bradford v. Winter, 30 Cal. Rptr. 243, 246 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
95. Id. at 244, 246.
96. Id. at 245.
97. Id. at 246.
98. Id.
99. See Livings, supra note 64, at 547.
100. Mario R. Arango & William R. Trueba, Jr., The Sports Chamber: Exculpatory
Agreements Under Pressure, 14 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1997).
101. Id. at 2, 8.
102. See id. at 8.
103. Levine v. Gross, 704 N.E.2d 262, 263 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
104. Id. at 263–64.
105. Id. at 264.
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are still applicable in medical battery. The court in Bradford v. Winter
analyzed consent broadly, noting that consent can be express or im94
plied. In Bradford, a patient signed a form giving express consent to a
doctor to complete a bronchoscopy, and additionally, to allow the doctor to perform “any other procedure that his . . . judgment may dic95
tate.” The patient brought suit for battery after learning that the doc96
tor removed a specimen for biopsy during the bronchoscopy. The
district court found that this was a normal procedure incident to the
bronchoscopy and was within the bounds of the express consent given
97
by the patient, and the appeals court affirmed. The broad consent given by the patient applied to a whole host of possible discretionary actions by the doctor and was therefore a complete bar to recovery by the
98
patient.
In sports, participation is often conditioned on the player giving con99
sent and waiving any claims for injury. Agreements may cover injuries
arising under normal circumstances in the sport or a whole host of antic100
ipated or unanticipated occurrences. Often these agreements, termed
“releases,” are meant to eliminate any duty an organizer of an event has
101
to the participant. However, they often do not speak of a duty owed
102
In Levine v. Gross, a karate student granted
by fellow participants.
consent to release the karate studio from “some risk of personal injury”
103
that covered “all liability in said course of instruction.” The student
asserted that “some risk” did not cover the detached retinas he suffered
104
that required surgery on both eyes. The court determined that the release was broad enough to cover those injuries and dismissed the ac105
tion. The court noted that the contract must be “clear, unequivocal,
and unambiguous,” and that it must cover all incurred injuries that are
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106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. (quoting Thompson v. McNeill, 559 N.E.2d 705, 709 (Ohio 1990)).
110. Levine, 704 N.E.2d at 264.
111. Moore, supra note 89, at 1637.
112. See id. at 1632–37.
113. See, e.g., Benitez v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 541 N.E.2d 29, 32 (N.Y. 1989)
(discussing assumption of risk); Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964, 968–70 (N.Y. 1986) (discussing implied consent); Arbegast v. Bd. of Educ., 480 N.E.2d 365, 371 (N.Y. 1985) (discussing
implied assumption of risk); Vendrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 26C, 376 P.2d 406, 414 (Or. 1962) (discussing assumption of risk).
114. See, e.g., Levine, 704 N.E.2d at 264.
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claimed in the tort suit. The court made note of two important factors
in its decision: first, that the participant was aware of the potential risks
that could result from participating in karate because he had previously
suffered, among other injuries, dislocated fingers, a knee injury that required surgery, and corneal abrasion; and second, that reckless miscon107
duct by a fellow participant may be a basis for a tort action. The plaintiff’s general knowledge of the potential for injury inherent in karate
108
had eliminated any ambiguity in the assumption of risk in the release.
The court noted that “the standard of care rises as the inherent danger
of the sport falls,” when examining the duty owed by participants to
109
each other. In this case, the dangers inherent in karate were apparent110
ly so high as to warrant a limited duty of care by the participants.
The question naturally arises whether an act committed, which the
injured party did not expressly consent to, can be the basis for a battery
tort claim. In such circumstances, the impact of intent in the battery
claim is of utmost importance. Some scholars have advocated for battery to require a single intent: the intent to cause unwanted or offensive
111
contact. Others have argued that there must be a dual-intent element
to battery: (1) the intent to cause the unwanted touch, and (2) the intent
112
to cause harm or pain. This additional intent requirement could filter
out cases where there was no consent, but the act that caused injury was
not intended to produce such a result. In these circumstances, were an
injury to occur outside of the normal playing time in a sport without intent to actually cause harm, no action could lie.
Many courts have sidestepped this issue and focused on the consent
113
Instead of searching for express consent, they
of the injured party.
114
find actual or implied consent, or assumption of risk. However, while
these two doctrines are separate and distinct in tort jurisprudence,
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115. See, e.g., Benitez, 541 N.E.2d at 32; Turcotte, 502 N.E.2d at 968–70; Arbegast, 480
N.E.2d at 371; Vendrell, 376 P.2d at 414.
116. Thompson v. Park River Corp., 830 N.E.2d 1252, 1255 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
117. Id. at 1265–66.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1265.
120. Avila v. Citrus Cmty. Coll. Dist., 131 P.3d 383, 385–86 (Cal. 2006).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 394.
123. Id. (quoting Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 710 (Cal. 1992)).
124. Avila, 131 P.3d at 394.
125. Id.
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courts often ambiguously use both terms and hold the injurer not liable
115
for the injury. In Thompson v. Park River Corp., a child taking swimming lessons was injured when he was pushed into the swimming pool
116
The court found that
by another child who was also taking lessons.
even though the offending child had acted outside of the rules of the
117
swimming lessons, he was not liable for two reasons. First, the act was
not done recklessly or intentionally and was therefore lacking the requi118
site intent to injure for the battery claim to be sustained. Second, the
injured child had assumed the risk of being injured because children’s
swimming lessons often involve an inherent amount of “rambunctious
119
behavior.”
The final circumstance that must be examined is in activities with
rules that are intentionally broken in order to cause harm. The court in
Avila v. Citrus Community College District analyzed a sports-injury bat120
tery claim. There, a baseball pitcher threw an inside pitch and hit the
batter in the head, apparently in retaliation for his team’s batter being
121
struck in a previous inning. The court recognized that the rules of the
game, which all participants had consented to, as well as the inherent
122
risks in baseball, include the risk of being intentionally struck.
The
court cited precedent in acknowledging that intentional or reckless acts
“totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport”
123
are not covered by assumption of risk or implied consent. However,
the court held that even if the pitch was intentional, the act did not fall
completely outside of the purview of normal activity in the sport to war124
The court reasoned that it is up to the umpires to enrant liability.
force the rules of the sport, and any judicial remedy for acts within the
125
sport would have a chilling effect on the conduct of the game. On the
issue of consent, the court equated the injury arising from the intentional striking of the batter with a pitch to a boxer accepting the risk of his
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C. Consent in Hazing Law
The act of “hazing” can be traced as far back as ancient Greece,
where soldiers were forced to endure pain and punishment as a sign of
127
their loyalty to the military. These hazing activities have since made
their way into the United States and have become prevalent in military
128
barracks, colleges, and high schools. Unfortunately, state legislatures
have struggled to define criminal hazing because “[h]azing means many
129
different things to different people.”
However, the term has been
broadly defined as “the act of putting another in a ridiculous, humiliat130
ing, or disconcerting position as part of an initiation process,” or as
“any humiliating or dangerous activity expected . . . to join a group, re131
Nevertheless, in 1901, Illigardless of . . . willingness to participate.”
nois became the first state to pass an anti-hazing law when it enacted a
statute criminalizing conduct “whereby any one sustains an injury to his
132
As of today, all but six states have fol[or her] person therefrom.”
lowed suit and enacted criminal or civil statutes that prohibit and punish
133
hazing. Despite this move by states’ legislatures, scholars have found
that there are several obstacles that impede the effectiveness of state anti-hazing statutes, and, in turn, these obstacles have spurred changes in

01/13/2014 11:22:05
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126. Id. at 395.
127. Gregory L. Acquaviva, Protecting Students from the Wrongs of Hazing Rites: A
Proposal for Strengthening New Jersey’s Anti-Hazing Act, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 305, 310–
11 (2008).
128. Id. at 311–16 (noting that hazing has become more common in high schools, particularly among student-athletes).
129. NADINE C. HOOVER, ALFRED UNIV., NATIONAL SURVEY: INITIATION RITES AND
ATHLETICS FOR NCAA SPORTS TEAMS 24 (1999), available at http://www.alfred.edu/sports_
hazing/docs/hazing.pdf.
130. Acquaviva, supra note 127, at 308–09 (quoting Frank J. Wozniak, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of “Hazing” Statutes, 30 A.L.R.5th 683, 683 (1995)).
131. Acquaviva, supra note 127, at 309 (omission in original) (quoting NADINE C.
HOOVER & NORMAN J. POLLARD, ALFRED UNIV., INITIATION RITES IN AMERICAN HIGH
SCHOOLS: A NATIONAL SURVEY 4 (2000), available at http://www.alfred.edu/hs_hazing/docs/
hazing__study.pdf).
132. Acquaviva, supra note 127, at 311–12 (alteration in original) (quoting 1901 Ill. Laws
145; Darryll M. Halcomb Lewis, The Criminalization of Fraternity, Non-Fraternity and NonCollegiate Hazing, 61 MISS. L.J. 111, 118–19 (1991)).
133. Acquaviva, supra note 127, at 313. States without anti-hazing statutes are Alaska,
Montana, South Dakota, Hawaii, New Mexico, and Wyoming. State Anti-Hazing Laws,
STOPHAZING.ORG, http://stophazing.org/laws.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2013).
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134. See, e.g., Amie Pelletier, Regulation of Rites: The Effect and Enforcement of Current
Anti-Hazing Statutes, 28 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 377, 387 (2002).
135. Id. at 386 & n.75.
136. Id. at 386 (citing 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5352 (West 1992)). Similarly, Delaware’s anti-hazing statute mimics the same language, stating that any activity within the statutory definition of “hazing” is “presumed to be ‘forced’ activity, the willingness of an individual to participate in such activity notwithstanding.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 9302 (2007).
137. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1190 (2002).
138. Pelletier, supra note 134, at 386 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-107.5(2) (LexisNexis 1999)).
139. IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.10 (West 2003) (emphasis added).
140. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-61 (2011).
141. WIS. STAT. § 948.51 (2011–2012).
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legislation to overcome such barriers.
To remove the need for subjective inquiry into the facts of hazing
cases, the legislatures of sixteen states have added provisions in anti135
hazing statutes that bar the victim-consent defense. Some states take
the approach of applying a presumption against consent or a presumption that hazing activity is per se forced activity. For example, Pennsylvania law applies a presumption against consent by providing that any
activity that fits within the statutory definition of hazing is “presumed to
be ‘forced’ activity, the willingness of an individual to participate in such
136
activity notwithstanding.” Oklahoma’s anti-hazing statute states that
any hazing activity is “presumed to be a forced activity, even if the stu137
dent willingly participates in such activity.” Utah’s anti-hazing statute
also has a similar prohibition against the victim-consent defense by assuming that victims under the age of twenty-one are more vulnerable to
138
peer pressure, thus prohibiting any consent to hazing by such persons.
Several states include in their anti-hazing statute a provision that
makes the victim’s consent irrelevant. For example, Iowa’s anti-hazing
statute defines “forced activity” as “any activity which is a condition of
initiation or admission into, or affiliation with, an organization, regard139
less of a student’s willingness to participate in the activity.” Georgia’s
anti-hazing statute also contains a provision that forced activity is prohibited “regardless of a student’s willingness to participate in such activi140
ty.” Wisconsin’s anti-hazing statute similarly states that “forced activity” is prohibited “regardless of a student’s willingness to participate in
141
the activity.”
Perhaps an even stronger mechanism employed by a number of
states is an explicit prohibition against the victim-consent defense in
hazing cases. Nevada’s anti-hazing statute provides that “[c]onsent of a
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142. Pelletier, supra note 134, at 386–87 (quoting NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.605(2)
(LexisNexis 2001)).
143. MO. ANN. STAT. § 578.365 (West 2011).
144. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 140b (2004).
145. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-607 (LexisNexis 2012).
146. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-2-2 (LexisNexis 2009) (emphasis added).
147. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-16-2 (LexisNexis 2012).
148. Jones v. Kappa Alpha Order, Inc. (Ex parte Barran), 730 So. 2d 203, 204 (Ala.
1998).
149. Id. at 204–05.
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victim of hazing is not a valid defense to a prosecution conducted [under
142
the anti-hazing statute].”
Missouri has a similar provision, which
143
Vermont’s antistates that “[c]onsent is not a defense to hazing.”
hazing statute states that “[i]t is not a defense . . . that the person against
whom the hazing was directed consented to or acquiesced in the hazing
144
Maryland’s anti-hazing provision also explicitly states that
activity.”
“[t]he implied or express consent of a student to hazing is not a de145
fense.”
Indiana provides the most explicit bar against the victim-consent defense by stating that hazing involves the act of “forcing or requiring an146
other person . . . with or without the consent of the other person.”
West Virginia’s statute also provides a strong bar against the victimconsent defense in any manner, stating that “the implied or expressed
consent or willingness of a person or persons to hazing shall not be a de147
fense under this section.”
By including these various provisions in their anti-hazing statutes,
these sixteen states have removed the subjective inquiry of consent from
consideration, thus presumably allowing courts to effectively and
properly adjudicate hazing cases. Courts, however, have addressed the
issue of consent in a limited number of instances. For example, a mere
handful of courts have found that fraternity pledges did not necessarily
have their psychological will overpowered and were thus able to consent
to the hazing they experienced.
In Jones v. Kappa Alpha Order, Inc. (Ex parte Barran), Jason Jones
was an Auburn University student who chose to pledge the fraternity of
148
Kappa Alpha. Jones claimed he was subjected to numerous hazing incidents, such as jumping into ditches filled with water, urine, and feces;
withstanding physical abuse; and appearing nightly at the fraternity
149
house for two a.m. meetings to be hazed in a variety of ways. When
Jones was suspended from school for poor academic performance, he
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Id. at 205.
Id.
Id. at 205–06.
Id. at 208.
Id. at 206–07.
Id. at 207.
Yost v. Wabash Coll., 976 N.E.2d 724, 728 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 735.
Id. at 745.
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151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
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160.
161.
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brought suit against the fraternity for negligence, assault and battery,
150
and the tort of outrage. The fraternity asserted the defense of assump151
tion of risk, alleging Jones voluntarily engaged in the hazing activities.
152
Jones claimed his participation was “not necessarily voluntary.”
The Supreme Court of Alabama sided with the fraternity and remanded the case with instruction for the trial court to grant its motion
153
for summary judgment on the negligence claim.
The supreme court
found significant the facts that Jones (1) knew “between 20% and 40%”
of his class had withdrawn from pledging, (2) knew of the hazing practices yet continued to show up for hazing events, and (3) covered up the
hazing incidents to school officials and his doctors even though he knew
154
the hazing would continue to occur. The court did not find persuasive
Jones’s argument that “a coercive environment hampered his free will to
155
the extent that he could not voluntarily choose to leave the fraternity.”
More recently, in Yost v. Wabash College, freshman Brian Yost suffered physical and mental injuries and was forced to drop out of school
due to an incident that occurred in connection with the Phi Psi fraterni156
ty. Yost, a Phi Psi pledge, decided to throw an upperclassman into a
157
creek to celebrate the upperclassman’s birthday. The friendly horseplay escalated until an upperclassman put Yost in a chokehold, at which
158
time Yost lost consciousness.
Yost filed a personal injury action against the fraternity, the college,
159
and the upperclassman. However, the court determined that since the
incident was instigated by Yost, he was not coerced into any action, and,
160
thus, the incident was not hazing. As such, the defendants breached
161
no duty to Yost as a matter of law.
Jones and Yost are outliers, however, when compared to cases from
other states. For example, the issue of consent was addressed by a New
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York court in the case of People v. Lenti (Lenti I). In Lenti I, the defendants were charged under the New York criminal hazing statute for
“[willfully], wrongfully and knowingly” assaulting victims by “striking
them about the body and face with clenched fists, open hands, forearms
163
and feet.”
The defendants asserted the victim-consent defense, but
the court dismissed such a defense and noted that in order for consent to
be a successful defense, there must have been an affirmative act by the
alleged victim which was not induced through either fraud or deceit and
“that the act performed should not exceed the extent of the terms of
164
The Lenti I court went on to note that even if the victim
consent.”
consented, “consent is not a carte blanche license to commit an una165
bridged assault.”
166
In People v. Lenti (Lenti II), the court expounded on the victimconsent defense, explaining that “[c]onsent of the pledges certainly
should not be a bar to prosecution” and that the victim-consent defense
was not applicable in cases where “the public conscience and morals are
167
shocked.”
In addressing this issue of victims’ consent, the court in
Lenti II proposed that the New York legislature amend the criminal
hazing statute to include explicit language barring such defenses in haz168
ing cases in the state of New York. Several other courts have followed
the reasoning laid out by the court in Lenti I and Lenti II and have re169
fused to allow consent to serve as a defense in hazing cases. Yet, in
cases where there is no explicit statutory language barring the use of
consent as a defense, hazing cases usually turn on the facts of the case
and whether a jury decides that the victim-pledge voluntarily participat170
ed in the hazing activities.
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162. People v. Lenti (Lenti I), 253 N.Y.S.2d 9, 15 (Nassau Cnty. Ct. 1964).
163. Id. at 11.
164. Id. at 15.
165. Id.
166. People v. Lenti (Lenti II), 260 N.Y.S.2d 284 (Nassau Cnty. Ct. 1965).
167. Id. at 287.
168. Id. at 287–88.
169. See, e.g., Oja v. Grand Chapter of Theta Chi Fraternity, Inc., 667 N.Y.S.2d 650, 651–
53 (Sup. Ct. 1997). In Oja, the court held that consumption of alcohol by a pledge during college fraternal organization hazing or initiation ritual may be considered involuntary. Id.
Thus, a survival action for conscious pain and suffering of a pledge who suffers fatal injuries
as a result of ingestion is not barred where drinking is imposed upon pledges, and their obedience extracted, as an express or implied condition of membership. Id. However, if consumption is voluntary, an estate may only recover for any resulting economic loss. Id.
170. Pelletier, supra note 134, at 386; see, e.g., Jones v. Kappa Alpha Order, Inc. (Ex
parte Barran), 730 So. 2d 203, 206–07 (Ala. 1998); see also supra notes 148–55 and accompa-
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In Quinn v. Sigma Rho Chapter of Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, William
Quinn brought a negligence suit against Beta Theta Pi Fraternity after
he suffered neurological damage to his hands and arms following a night
171
Quinn alleged that, as an eighteen-year-old freshman
of drinking.
pledge, he was directed to drink a forty-ounce pitcher of beer without
removing it from his lips, was brought to a tavern and instructed to drink
from an eight-ounce whiskey bottle, and was placed on a hardwood
172
floor to sleep after becoming unconscious. Quinn asserted that he was
left asleep for fourteen hours before he awoke, went to a hospital, and
173
registered a .25 blood-alcohol content (BAC). He was informed that,
174
at its peak, his BAC was likely at near fatal levels.
In his complaint, Quinn alleged that the fraternity did more than
simply furnish him with alcohol, but rather required him to drink past
175
the point of intoxication to be initiated into the fraternity. The court
agreed and held that the “plaintiff was coerced into being his own exe176
cutioner.” The court continued:
It is true that [Quinn] could have avoided the situation by
walking away from the fraternity. In that respect, [Quinn’s] actions in participating in the ceremony were voluntary. Yet, as
the complaint alleges, membership in the defendant fraternity
was a “much valued status.” It can be assumed that great social
pressure was applied to [Quinn] to comply . . . perhaps to the extent of blinding [Quinn] to any dangers he might face. To the extent that [Quinn] acted willingly, liability can be transferred to
177
him under principles of comparative negligence.

C M
Y K

01/13/2014 11:22:05

nying text.
171. Quinn v. Sigma Rho Chapter of Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 507 N.E.2d 1193, 1195
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1197.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1198.

34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 14 Side B

In finding that Quinn had a cause of action against the fraternity, the
court noted that “the social pressure that exists” when a student pledges
a fraternity “is so great that compliance with initiation requirements
178
places him or her in a position of acting in a coerced manner.”
In State v. Brown, Sherdene Brown was found guilty of complicity to
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State v. Brown, 630 N.E.2d 397, 399 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
Id. at 400.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 404.
Id.
Id.
Nisbet v. Bucher, 949 S.W.2d 111, 113 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 113–14.
Id. at 116.
Id.
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hazing under Ohio’s hazing statute. Brown was a member of Alpha
Kappa Alpha at Kent State University when she “physical[ly] discipline[d]” pledges by forcing them to stand on their heads, beating them
180
with paddles, and smacking and striking pledges in the face and head.
Brown was subsequently indicted by a grand jury for complicity to haz181
182
ing. Brown appealed the indictment.
Brown argued that the pledges knew the pledging process involved
183
physical discipline. Brown attempted to draw an analogy between the
pledge process and “ordinary physical conduct incident to high contact
sports,” where physical interaction is permitted due to consent of the
184
participants. The court rejected this argument on two grounds: (1) the
pledges did not consent to the degree of physical discipline used, and (2)
the state of Ohio’s hazing statute did not include consent as a valid de185
fense.
In Nisbet v. Bucher, Michael Nisbet died after consuming alcohol as
part of the initiation process for the St. Pat’s Board, a campus organiza186
His parents’ wrongful
tion at the University of Missouri at Rolla.
death action was dismissed by the trial court for failure to state a cause
of action, but they appealed alleging that, to gain membership on the St.
Pat’s Board, their son was coerced into chugging excessive amounts of
alcohol and was denied medical assistance once he became uncon187
scious.
The Missouri Court of Appeals agreed with the Illinois Court of
188
Appeals’ reasoning in Quinn. The court stated that Nisbet was pressured into drinking alcohol “for the specific purpose of inducing intoxication,” and such consumption was a requirement of his induction into
189
The court also recognized that even though
the St. Pat’s Board.
Nisbet could have walked away, he was “blinded to the danger he was
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190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Carpetta v. Pi Kappa Alpha Fraternity, 718 N.E.2d 1007, 1011 (Ohio Ct. C.P. Lucas
Cnty. 1998).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1016.
195. Id. at 1017.
196. Id. at 1017, 1019.
197. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant Travis Montgomery’s
Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant David May’s Joinder Therein at 2–3, Meredith v. Montgomery, No. 02-1135, 2004 WL 5913350 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 17, 2004), 2003 WL
25969631, at *1–2 [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Memorandum].
198. Plaintiff’s Memorandum, supra note 197, at 2.
199. Id.
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facing” by the great social pressure applied by the St. Pat’s Board.
The court concluded that “[i]t is a question for the trier of fact as to
what degree [he] was coerced by defendants to consume excessive quantities of alcohol and as to what extent his will to make a conscious deci191
sion about his alcohol consumption was overcome.”
In Carpetta v. Pi Kappa Alpha Fraternity, Charles Carpetta was a
University of Toledo student pledging the Pi Kappa Alpha fraternity
when fraternity members ridiculed him by yelling and swearing at him;
requiring him to go on a scavenger hunt to an adult bookstore, a gay
bar, and a brothel; forcing him to sit alone in a dark room for extended
192
periods of time; and forcing him to kneel in rats’ blood. When Carpetta quit the pledge process and dropped out of school, he brought suit
193
against the fraternity under Ohio’s hazing statute. The defendant fraternity filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that the statute’s
194
term “acts of coercion” was unconstitutionally vague.
The court found that the term was not unconstitutionally vague because “coercing” simply meant any act that caused another person to
195
engage in any act of initiation. The court ultimately held that Carpetta
could recover for any physical harm inflicted by the acts of initiation,
196
but not for any mental or emotional harm.
In Meredith v. Montgomery, Chad Meredith was a freshman at the
University of Miami and was pledging the Epsilon Beta Chapter of the
Kappa Sigma fraternity when he drowned while swimming across Lake
197
Osceola. On the night of his death, he attended a party with the fra198
ternity’s grand master of ceremonies and the fraternity’s president.
The two fraternity officers decided they were going to swim in the lake
199
and asked Meredith if he was going to as well. Meredith skeptically
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asked if they were serious, but attempted the crossing and subsequently
200
drowned.
Meredith’s family brought suit, and the two defendants sought summary judgment, arguing “[t]here is no duty to protect another adult
201
from the consequences of his own voluntary acts.” The plaintiffs argued Meredith’s acts were not truly voluntary, citing a deposition by Joel Epstein (founder of the U.S. Department of Education’s Higher Education Center for Alcohol & Other Drug Prevention) in which Epstein
admitted pledging causes the “pledges to do things that they would oth202
erwise be unwilling to do.” “The exercise of peer pressure, whether
direct and confrontational or subtle and more disguised is particularly
203
effective when it comes from the fraternity president . . . .” Presumably relying on Epstein’s deposition, the jury found in favor of Meredith
and awarded his parents nearly seven million dollars each for their pain
204
and suffering. The jury found that the defendants were each forty-five
205
percent at fault, and Meredith was ten percent at fault.
As noted, most criminal law cases tend to reject consent as a defense
206
except where the activity is deemed appropriate by courts. The civil
law, on the other hand, permits consent as a defense, especially when
the victim assumed the risk of the activity in which they were harmed or
207
where injury was a foreseeable risk of participating in the activity. Of
the forty-four state anti-hazing statutes, about one-third of them bar the
use of the victim-consent defense by explicitly barring the defense, applying a presumption against consent or that hazing activity is per se
208
forced.
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200. Id. at 2–3.
201. Id. at 4 (quoting Defendant, Travis Montgomery’s Motion for Summary Judgment
at 7, Meredith v. Montgomery, No. 02-1135, 2004 WL 5913350 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 17, 2004),
2003 WL 25969630, at *4).
202. Plaintiff’s Memorandum, supra note 197, at 5 n.1 (quoting Affidavit of Joel Epstein
at 3, Meredith v. Montgomery, No. 02-1135, 2004 WL 5913350 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 17, 2004),
2003 WL 25969483, at *2).
203. Affidavit of Joel Epstein, supra note 202, at 3.
204. Meredith v. Montgomery, No. 02-11335, 2004 WL 5913350, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb.
17, 2004).
205. Defendant, Travis Montgomery’s, Motion to Set Aside Verdict and Final Judgment
and to Enter Judgment in Accordance with Motion for Directed Verdict at 2, Meredith v.
Montgomery, No. 02-11335, 2004 WL 5913352 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 24, 2004), 2004 WL 5913714,
at *1.
206. See supra Part II.A.
207. See supra Part II.B.
208. State Anti-Hazing Laws, supra note 133; see also Pelletier, supra note 134, at 386 &
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III. HAZING CONSENT: A PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
Few courts, if any, reference psychological theories related to why
hazing victims may persist to participate in hazing activities. Thus,
courts fail to fully evaluate (1) the degree to which victims consented
and (2) the extent to which victims’ psychological will was truly overcome during the hazing experience. This Part explores the psychological theories that may explain why hazing victims consent to a range of
hazing activities.
A. Escalation of Commitment

C M
Y K

01/13/2014 11:22:05

n.75 (indicating that sixteen states have anti-hazing statutes).
209. See Joel Brockner, The Escalation of Commitment to a Failing Course of Action:
Toward Theoretical Progress, 17 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 39, 39–40 (1992) (providing a review of
the theoretical variations on the escalation of commitment).
210. See id. at 40.
211. E.g., Glen Whyte, Escalating Commitment in Individual and Group Decision Making: A Prospect Theory Approach, in 54 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN
DECISION PROCESSES 430, 430 (1993).
212. See Brockner, supra note 209, at 43–49 (reviewing escalation research and finding
support for the self-justification hypothesis).
213. Id. at 40, 43.
214. See Barry M. Staw & Jerry Ross, Behavior in Escalation Situations: Antecedents,
Prototypes, and Solutions, in 9 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 39, 50–51
(1987).
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The phenomenon of “escalation of commitment” refers to situations
where decision-makers commit additional resources to a failing course
209
of action. An escalation of commitment situation is characterized by
three essential features: costs of continuing the same course of action,
opportunities for withdrawal, and uncertainty about the consequences
210
of persistence and withdrawal. Researchers have found that escalation
211
effects persist in both group as well as individual decision processes.
A variety of theories have been advanced to explain escalation of commitment. A synopsis of some theories is below.
For example, self-justification theory, which is based on Festinger’s
theory of cognitive dissonance, is the most prominent explanation for
212
escalation behavior. Self-justification theory posits that decision makers are reluctant to admit that their earlier decisions were incorrect and
thus invest additional resources in an attempt to demonstrate the cor213
According to Staw and Ross, escalation
rectness of those decisions.
tendencies are greatest when the decision maker is personally responsi214
ble for the failed course of action.
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215. Whyte, supra note 211, at 437.
216. Id. at 445–46.
217. D. Ramona Bobocel & John P. Meyer, Escalating Commitment to a Failing Course
of Action: Separating the Roles of Choice and Justification, 79 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 360, 360
(1994).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 362.
221. Id.
222. Brockner, supra note 209, at 40.
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The effect of personal responsibility has since been investigated under a variety of situations, with the results generally supportive of Staw
and Ross’s proposition. For example, Whyte’s 1993 study hypothesized,
inter alia, that “[e]scalating commitment to a failing project will occur in
individual and group decision making regardless of personal responsibil215
ity” for sunk costs. Whyte found that although personal responsibility
216
was not strictly necessary, it did significantly increase escalation.
The 1994 study by Bobocel and Meyer offered greater empirical insight on the impact of personal responsibility (operationalized as choice)
217
and justification on escalation of commitment.
Bobocel and Meyer
noted that most previous research confounded personal responsibility
218
and public justification. The purpose of their study was to separate the
effects of choice, private justification, and public justification on the de219
cision of whether or not to persist in a failed course of action. Results
showed that choice exerts no significant effect on escalating commitment but that both private and public justifications significantly increase
220
escalation of commitment to the same extent. At first blush, it would
seem that the desire to appear consistent—either to others or oneself—
is a powerful motive for escalation behaviors. However, because escalation of commitment occurred even when individuals did not justify their
behavior to anyone else, Bobocel and Meyer concluded that “public justification is not necessary for escalating commitment and that private
221
justification is sufficient.”
Escalation tendencies may also be partly explained by expectancy
theory, which asserts that decision makers assess the subjective expected
utility of allocating additional resources based on estimates of the value
of goal attainment (i.e., rewards minus costs) and the probability that
222
Accordingly, “if the
additional resources will help attain that goal.
reasons for the negative feedback [are perceived to be] unstable rather
than stable,” then the decision maker would consider the probability of
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goal attainment to be more favorable and would therefore be more like223
ly to commit additional resources.
Prospect theory has been proposed as an alternative explanation to
self-justification for the behavior associated with escalation of commit224
ment in individual and group settings. Prospect theory describes how
225
people actually behave when confronted with loss situations. According to this theory, individuals are risk seeking when choosing between
two losing options but risk averse when choosing between two winning
226
options. Thus, the action one takes may depend upon how the prob227
lem is framed. If the decision is perceived to be in the positive direction (i.e., it will generate gains), then individuals typically react in a risk228
averse manner. Thus, in this paradigm, a decision maker would prefer
“a sure win of $50 over a 50 percent chance to win $100 and a 50 percent
229
chance to win $0.” By contrast, if the decision is perceived to be in the
negative direction (i.e., it will generate losses), then individuals will react
230
in a risk-seeking manner.
Thus, decision makers in this paradigm
would prefer “to take a 50 percent chance on losing $100 and a 50 per231
cent chance of losing $0 than to accept a sure loss of $50.”
In his 1993 study, Whyte contends that prospect theory provides a
more compelling justification for escalation behaviors than does self232
justification theory.
Whyte’s contention is premised on the assump233
tion that individuals facing an escalation dilemma are loss averse.
Thus, according to Whyte, individuals facing escalation situations prefer
to allocate additional resources and increase the probability of a larger
loss, rather than to accept the sure loss if they declined to allocate addi234
tional resources.
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223. Id.
224. Id. at 50.
225. Id.
226. Id. (citing Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263 (1979)) (noting that unlike the traditional
model’s assumption of risk neutrality, people tend to be risk averse in the domains of gains,
risk seeking in the domains of losses, and more risk sensitive to losses than to gains).
227. Brockner, supra note 209, at 50.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Whyte, supra note 211, at 448.
233. Id. at 433.
234. Id.
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235. Brockner, supra note 209, at 52 (citing Michael G. Bowen, The Escalation Phenomenon Reconsidered: Decision Dilemmas or Decision Errors?, 12 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 52
(1987)).
236. Bowen, supra note 235, at 52; Barry M. Staw, Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy: A Study
of Escalating Commitment to a Chosen Course of Action, 16 ORG. BEHAVIOR & HUM.
BEHAV. 27 (1976); Staw & Ross, supra note 214, at 52–54.
237. Brockner, supra note 209, at 54.
238. Id. at 53–54.
239. Id. at 56.
240. See id.
241. See id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
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Professor Bowen’s decision dilemma theory has also been offered to
235
explain escalation behaviors. Bowen suggested that in previous escalation research, including Staw’s seminal study in 1976, decision makers
received equivocal, rather than negative, feedback about their initial re236
Accordingly, decision dilemma theory posits that
source allocation.
people escalate not in response to negative feedback, but in response to
237
feedback that can be interpreted in multiple ways. As such, escalation
behavior is more of a response to a dilemma than it is an act of error because investing additional resources may allow additional opportunities
for a strategy to work, or allow the collection of more information and
the passage of time, which may lead to greater understanding of the sit238
uation.
Self-presentation theory is yet another explanation for escalating
commitment. Self-presentation theory focuses on the effects of an on239
Proponents of this theory contend
looking audience on escalation.
that decision makers escalate commitment to failed courses of action
240
because they want to be perceived as able to reach suitable choices.
Thus, they respond to escalation dilemmas by allocating additional resources because departing from a previous pursuit may compromise
241
credibility.
Proponents of self-presentation theory also maintain that organiza242
tional culture influences escalating commitment. Studies on employees and organizational culture have found that employees typically act
in a manner that is consistent with the organizational values, which is in
243
Thus, escalation is
part a reflection of a self-presentation motive.
more likely to occur in organizations that have a culture that makes
people unwilling to admit failure or that values consistency in behav-
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244

ior.
However, escalation is less likely in organizations where people
245
are free to admit errors or that value experimentation.
B. Groupthink
Street and Anthony posit a theoretical relationship between group246
think and escalation of commitment models. Groupthink is a deficient
group decision-making process that has a high probability of producing
247
poor decisions with disastrous consequences. Groupthink occurs when
“concurrence-seeking becomes so dominant in a cohesive [in-group]
that it tends to override realistic appraisal of alternative courses of ac248
tion.” There are three antecedent conditions to groupthink behavior:
(1) group cohesiveness; (2) a provocative situational context; and (3)
249
structural faults of the organization. The first, and most important, antecedent condition of groupthink is cohesiveness (i.e., de250
individuation). A moderate to high level of group cohesion is neces251
sary, though insufficient by itself, for the development of groupthink.
The second antecedent condition, a provocative situational context,
arises when the group has low group self-esteem and is required to make
252
Low group self-esteem is
consequential decisions under high stress.
induced by the group’s previous failing decisions that raise questions
253
about the group’s competence and moral standards.
High stress results from external threats, with little chance of the group developing
254
better decisions than the ones that led to previous failures. External
threats, such as navigating a crisis situation, are said “to increase the
255
likelihood of concurrence-seeking behavior[].”
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244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Marc D. Street & William P. Anthony, A Conceptual Framework Establishing the
Relationship Between Groupthink and Escalating Commitment Behavior, 28 SMALL GROUP
RES. 267, 268–69 (1997).
247. See id. at 270 (citing Irving L. Janis, Groupthink, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Nov. 1971, at
43, 43).
248. Street & Anthony, supra note 246, at 270 (alteration in original) (quoting Janis, supra note 247, at 43).
249. Street & Anthony, supra note 246, at 270–72.
250. Id. at 270.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 272.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. (citing Paul ‘t Hart, Irving L. Janis’ Victims of Groupthink, 12 POL. PSYCHOL.
247, 257–59 (1991); Chris P. Neck & Gregory Moorhead, Jury Deliberations in the Trial of
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U.S. v. John DeLorean: A Case Analysis of Groupthink Avoidance and an Enhanced Framework, 45 HUM. REL. 1077, 1077–80 (1992)).
256. Street & Anthony, supra note 246, at 272.
257. See id.
258. Id. at 276–79.
259. Id. at 276.
260. Id. at 277.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 278 (citing Whyte, supra note 211, at 430).
263. Street & Anthony, supra note 246, at 279.
264. Id. at 279–86.
265. Id.
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The third antecedent condition for the development of groupthink
256
concerns structural faults of the organization. These structural faults
involve: (1) insulation from critical evaluation and analysis by other significant group members; (2) inadequate decision-making procedures, to
include the absence of procedures for searching for information, investigating consequences, and proposing alternative actions; (3) a lack of impartial leadership; and (4) a lack of diversity in backgrounds or ideolo257
gies.
Street and Anthony put forward four assumptions that underlie the
alleged theoretical link between groupthink and escalation of commit258
ment. First, they redefine the concept of group cohesion. Previous researchers have maintained that cohesion is comprised of three dimensions: interpersonal attraction, pride in or desire for group membership,
259
The definition put forth by Street and Anthony
and task cohesion.
consists of only the first two dimensions (interpersonal attraction and
260
pride in group membership).
Second, they assume that the group is cohesive in the way defined
above and simultaneously “suffers from one of the other two sets of antecedent conditions in the groupthink model before [being] exposed to
261
an escalation situation.” Third, citing the 1993 study by Glenn Whyte,
they assume that escalation behaviors can and do occur at the group
262
level. Fourth, they assume that group cohesion, as defined in the first
assumption, increases the tendency to escalate commitment to failing
263
courses of action.
Next, Street and Anthony put forth three propositions, each of
which combines variables from the groupthink model with a corre264
Each proposition assumes that
sponding set of escalation variables.
265
the group is cohesive as defined by the first assumption above. The
first proposition concerns a group with moderate to high levels of cohe-
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266. Id. at 280.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 280–81.
271. Id. at 282.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 284. For the four types of structural faults, see supra note 257 and accompanying text.
274. Street & Anthony, supra note 246, at 284.
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sion that is “suffering from conditions consistent with the provocative
266
situational context . . . before it is exposed to an escalation situation.”
Thus, the cohesive group is suffering from “stress from external events,
low levels of self-esteem, and pressures for concurrence-seeking actions
267
among members prior to being exposed to an escalation situation.”
According to Street and Anthony, the escalation situation increases
stress levels, exacerbating the group’s low self-esteem, and thereby in268
Relying on the
creases the group’s concurrence-seeking tendencies.
self-justification and face-saving theories of escalating commitment,
Street and Anthony posit that the group will respond to this precarious
269
situation by escalating commitment to their failing course of action.
Street and Anthony explain, in essence, that the group’s behavior is a
270
For those readefense mechanism for coping with decisional stress.
sons, Street and Anthony’s first proposition contends that cohesive
groups suffering from high stress or low self-esteem are more likely to
escalate commitment to failed actions than are cohesive groups not suf271
fering from those conditions.
The second proposition concerns a highly cohesive group that is subject to various elements of the structural faults group of antecedent conditions in the groupthink model before being exposed to an escalation
272
situation. The presence of any one of the four structural faults is said
to reduce the probability of the group engaging in a rational assessment
273
of its alternatives before making a decision. Street and Anthony contend that this phenomenon is greater when a group faces an escalation
274
situation.
They explain that while the lack of structural constraints
within the organization alone retards rational assessment, the additional
presence of the psychological and social determinants that urge escalation behaviors further increases the probability that the group will arrive
at a decision based upon irrational considerations (i.e., considering sunk
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275

costs).
This interaction between the structural faults, “the selfjustification, information-processing distortion, and face-saving” varia276
bles ultimately increases commitment to previous bad decisions.
Street and Anthony’s second proposition asserts that cohesive groups
operating with structural faults are more likely to escalate commitment
277
to failed decisions than groups not operating with structural faults.
To summarize briefly, the first proposition concerned the interactive
effects of group cohesion and a provocative situational context, while
the second proposition focused on the interactive effects of group cohesion and structural faults. According to Street and Anthony, those two
propositions demonstrated the relationship between the two sets of antecedent variables and the concomitant social and psychological deter278
They ultimately contended that
minants in the escalation model.
groups characterized by those antecedent conditions are more likely to
escalate commitment to failed courses of action than groups not charac279
terized by those antecedent conditions.
Street and Anthony’s third proposition was simply a combination of
280
the previous two. It asserts that cohesive groups characterized by the
presence of all of the antecedent conditions of groupthink are more likely to escalate commitment to failed actions than are cohesive groups
who are not characterized by all of the antecedent conditions of group281
think.
C. Evolutionary Psychology
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275. Id.
276. Id. at 285.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 286.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 286–87.
281. Id. at 286.
282. Jennifer R. Spoor & Janice R. Kelly, The Evolutionary Significance of Affect in
Groups: Communication and Group Bonding, 7 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL.
398, 398 (2004).
283. Id. at 401.
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Spoor and Kelly’s 2004 article situates the phenomenon of group
members developing shared moods and emotions (collectively referred
to under the umbrella term of “affect” or “group affect”) in the context
282
of evolutionary history. Spoor and Kelly suggest that affect in groups
283
This coordination
has primarily served as a coordination function.
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284

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 401–02.
Id. at 402.
Id.
Id. at 402–03.
Id. at 402–03, 405.
Id. at 403.
Id. at 404.
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284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 20 Side B

function can take one of two forms.
“First, group members’ various
affective reactions can quickly provide information about the environ285
ment, group structure, and group goals to other group members . . . .”
In other words, shared affect coordinates group members through a
communication function. Second, shared affect can mobilize efforts to286
ward group goals through fostering group bonds and group loyalty.
“These two functions of group [affect] are closely related and mutually
287
reinforcing.”
Spoor and Kelly contend that the development of mechanisms such
as emotional contagion and interaction synchrony have been advanta288
geous for group survival throughout evolutionary history. Emotional
contagion refers to the automatic processes through which individuals
mimic and synchronize their facial expressions, vocalizations, posture,
289
and movements with those of other individuals in the group. One consequence of such mimicry is the “convergence [of] mood and emotions
across group members,” resulting in a homogenous emotional state
290
throughout the group.
Spoor and Kelly also use an evolutionary perspective to explain the
291
differing adaptive benefits of positive and negative affective states.
Communication of positive affective states had the effect of promoting
cooperation within groups, while communicating negative affective
states had the effect of promoting collective action in response to nega292
Thus, because negative emotional
tive aspects in the environment.
states typically “conveyed critical survival information about the environment, group members may be particularly aware of the presence of
293
negative emotions within the group.”
Spoor and Kelly also contend that group members profited from the
development of affect regulation and control mechanisms that maintain
294
the level of affect that is appropriate for a desired outcome. Such ex-
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295. Id.
296. See id. at 405.
297. See id.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 405–06.
300. Id. (citing Brian Mullen & Carolyn Cooper, The Relation Between Group Cohesiveness and Performance: An Integration, 115 PSYCHOL. BULL. 210, 220–21, 225 (1994)).
301. Spoor & Kelly, supra note 282, at 406.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
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plicit affect regulation strategies can function to communicate the
295
group’s status hierarchies, as well as its larger group goals. This aspect
of the communicative function highlights the importance of both homogenous and heterogeneous levels of affect within the group. Homogenous levels of affect in a group might be important for the pursuit of
296
By contrast, affect regulation to communicate
specific group goals.
status differences stresses the importance of heterogeneous levels of af297
fect within groups.
Spoor and Kelly propose that the second primary function of shared
affect in groups is to coordinate group action through facilitating the de298
velopment of group member bonds and group loyalty. In explaining
group affect, Spoor and Kelly focus on two constructs: group cohesion
299
and group rapport. Group cohesion is a “multi-dimensional construct
that includes positive interpersonal interaction, task commitment, and
300
group pride.” Ultimately, “the development of group cohesion serves
to create bonds between group members, loyalty to the groups, and pos301
itive feelings toward tasks that the group completes together.”
Group rapport is similar to group cohesion and has three components: “mutual attention and involvement, coordination among partici302
pants in the interaction, and positive affect.” Spoor and Kelly contend
that developing group rapport is beneficial to group survival for several
303
reasons. First, experiencing group rapport makes members “more attentive and easily influenced by each other,” suggesting that the development of group rapport influences group members’ susceptibility to
304
Second, the coordination component of group
emotional contagion.
rapport is identical to interaction synchronization, suggesting that
“group rapport can be indexed by regulation of the interaction that coordinates the behavior of participants and provides predictable patterns
305
of behavior.” Third, “[t]he final component of group rapport, positive
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affect, is closely tied to group cohesiveness” and affects group stability.
Taken together, the group cohesion and rapport determine the strength
of the social bonds within a group and in turn the group’s ability or ina307
bility to effectively coordinate the pursuit of group goals.
The 2007 study by Peters and Kashima provides further insight on
the communication function of shared affect by examining the role of
308
emotional sharing (i.e., the social sharing of emotional social talk).
Results of their study revealed that emotional sharing can perform a
function (affecting what they call the “social triad”) by creating links between people, informing them about their shared position in the envi309
In other words, the simple
ronment, and coordinating social action.
act of sharing an emotional experience can create unique bonds between
the audience and the narrator, and in turn foster a shared understanding
310
of the world. This shared understanding of the world can be used to
311
unite previously separate groups in coordinated social action.
D. Ingroup-Outgroup Dynamics
Bosson and colleagues conducted an empirical test on the folk belief
that shared positive feelings—as opposed to shared negative feelings—
312
facilitate stronger bonds between two people.
Contrary to folk wisdom, they proposed that two people sharing a dislike of a target person
would promote closeness more readily than sharing a liking for that tar313
get. The power of shared negativity in friendship formation was tested
by measuring and manipulating the extent to which people shared spe314
cific negative and positive attitudes about others. Study 1 and Study 2
required participants to list the positive and negative attitudes that they
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306. Id.
307. See id.
308. Kim Peters & Yoshihisa Kashima, From Social Talk to Social Action: Shaping the
Social Triad with Emotion Sharing, 93 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 780, 780 (2007).
309. Id. at 780, 786, 790 (reporting and discussing results of Study 1 and Study 2, which
focused on the three simultaneous consequences of emotion sharing).
310. Id. at 791–92 (reporting and discussing the results of Study 3, which extended the
two previous studies to confirm that the creation of the shared worldview was in fact due to
emotion sharing).
311. See id. at 793–95 (reporting and discussing the results of Study 4, which extended
the three previous studies to confirm that emotion sharing does in fact lead to the creation of
coalitions).
312. Jennifer K. Bosson et al., Interpersonal Chemistry Through Negativity: Bonding by
Sharing Negative Attitudes About Others, 13 PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 135, 135 (2006).
313. Id.
314. Id. at 137.
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315

shared with their closest friends. Results revealed that people tend to
recall a larger proportion of shared negative than positive attitudes
316
about others.
Study 3 examined the causal link between the discovery of shared
317
negatives about others and interpersonal attraction.
Participants first indicated both a positive and a negative attitude
toward a fictitious target person and then learned that they
shared either their positive or their negative attitude about the
target with another participant whom they believed they would
soon meet. Participants then rated their feelings of closeness to
318
the other participant.

315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
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Id.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 143.
Id.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 137.
Kenneth L. Dion, Cohesiveness as a Determinant of Ingroup-Outgroup Bias, 28 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 163, 163–64 (1973).
322. Id.; see also Muzafer Sherif, Superordinate Goals in the Reduction of Intergroup
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Results showed that discovering a shared negative attitude about a target person predicted liking for a stranger more strongly than discovering
319
a shared positive attitude, but only when attitudes were weak. In other words, when people discovered that they shared a strong attitude
about the stranger, they felt close to the stranger regardless of whether
the attitude was positive or negative.
Taken together, these results suggest that a strong negative attitude
about a target can be a powerful bonding agent during friendship formation. Bosson and colleagues posited that their findings suggest that
one of the functions of negative attitudes is the establishment of in320
groups and outgroups. In the context of their study, this means that
the discovery of a shared dislike for another person fosters a sense of ingroup solidarity that meets people’s fundamental need for connectedness and belonging.
Dion’s 1973 study presented the question of what is responsible for
321
Dion hypothesized that “ingroup cohesion would iningroup bias.
crease discrimination toward an outgroup” and, extending past prior researchers, proposed that this relationship may be explained in terms of
322
the intergroup relations theories propounded by Sherif and Tajafel.
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Conflict, 63 AM. J. SOC. 349 (1958); Henri Tajfel, Experiments in Intergroup Discrimination,
SCI. AM., Nov. 1970, at 96.
323. Dion, supra note 321, at 163; Sherif, supra note 322, at 350.
324. Dion, supra note 321, at 163 (noting a study “finding that persons in highly cohesive
groups are more overtly hostile toward a frustrating agent than individuals in less cohesive
groups” (citing Albert Pepitone & George Reichling, Group Cohesiveness and the Expression
of Hostility, 8 HUM. REL. 327, 336 (1955))).
325. Dion, supra note 321, at 164; Tajfel, supra note 322, at 98–99.
326. Dion, supra note 321, at 168.
327. Id. at 169.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 164.
330. Id. at 166.
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Sherif’s theory posits that competition between groups leads to in323
tragroup cohesion and intergroup hostility.
Further, subsequent research on Sherif’s theory suggested that competition produced outgroup
hostility because highly cohesive groups became more frustrated by
324
competition than groups with low cohesion. Tajafel’s theory contends
that discrimination toward the outgroup was a product of a “generic”
325
group norm that one ought to favor the ingroup over the outgroup.
Results failed to support Dion’s hypothesis that increasing group cohesiveness would increase exploitation and devaluation of the out326
group. Dion conceded that the results of his study do not necessarily
contradict Sherif’s theory; rather, he suggested that the inconsistent result was due to the fact that the inferences he drew from Sherif’s theory
and subsequent empirical studies were inapplicable to his experimental
327
design. He explained that if intergroup bias were a product on a “generic” ingroup-outgroup norm, then it would necessarily follow that increasing cohesion would lead to greater conformity to the “generic”
norm and, in turn, greater exploitation and devaluation of the out328
group.
Dion’s study also investigated “whether persons in highly cohesive
groups exhibit greater cooperativeness and admiration toward their
[group members] than do those in less cohesive groups,” as well as
“whether the differential bias toward ingroup versus outgroup [members] is more accentuated in highly cohesive groups than in less cohesive
329
ones.” The results showed that members of high-cohesive groups exhibit differential biases toward ingroup and outgroup in that high levels
of cohesion produced significantly greater cooperation toward the in330
Moreover, members of highgroup than toward the outgroup.
cohesive groups evaluated their fellow members more positively than
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 169.
Id.
Minoru Karasawa, Effects of Cohesiveness and Inferiority upon Ingroup Favoritism,
30 JAPANESE PSYCHOL. RES. 49, 49 (1988).
336. Id. at 54–55.
337. Id. at 55–56.
338. Id. at 57.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 51, 58.
341. Id. at 51.
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they did members of an outgroup. Members of low-cohesive groups
did not as strongly exhibit either of these biases toward ingroup favorit332
ism.
Dion interpreted the results as supporting a cognitive differentiation
333
hypothesis. That is, “high cohesiveness leads group members to cognitively differentiate their ingroup from the outgroup,” while lowcohesion group members fail to perceive themselves and their fellow
334
members as comprising an ingroup.
Karawasa hypothesized that cohesion facilitates social comparison,
335
which in turn increases ingroup favoritism. Results largely supported
336
this hypothesis. Inferiority significantly decreased ingroup favoritism
in groups with low cohesion, whereas inferiority increased ingroup fa337
voritism in groups with high cohesion. Thus, the effect of feelings of
inferiority on intergroup behavior is dependent upon the level of cohesion in the group.
In groups with low cohesion, members respond to knowledge of ingroup inferiority by cognitively denying their membership and ultimate338
According to Kaly derogating and departing from the ingroup.
rasawa, this low ingroup enhancement motivation (i.e., the lack of a
desire to rate the ingroup positively in response to an identity threat) is
339
experienced because members do not strongly identify with the group.
By contrast, groups with high cohesion respond to knowledge that their
ingroup is inferior on a certain dimension by enhancing their ingroup
340
evaluations on a different dimension. It is important to note that these
effects are only observed when the outgroup is a relevant comparator
341
for the ingroup.
Karasawa interpreted the results as suggesting that cohesiveness of
the ingroup can “buffer” the impact of threats (e.g., knowledge of in-
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342

group inferiority) on ingroup evaluations. That is, facilitating identification with the group can protect low-status group members from ingroup devaluation and promote their ingroup enhancement motiva343
tions.
A recent study by Castano and colleagues merges insights from Terror Management Theory (TMT) and social identity theory to argue that
ingroup members identify more with ingroup when they were reminded
344
of the inevitability of their own death. Results yielded support for this
345
proposition. The results also “showed that ingroup bias was associated
both with ingroup identification and ingroup entitativity,” confirming
346
previous studies that examined these relationships more directly.
Castano and colleagues interpreted this finding as providing evidence for the hypothesis that entitativity and identification are distinct
347
though related concepts. Identification with the group is said to provide psychological protection against the fear engendered by knowledge
348
of personal mortality.
Perceived entitativity allegedly allows one to
transcend notions of personal mortality by shifting from a personal to a
social identity, because, in contrast to personal identity, social identity is
349
not subject to mortal fate.
Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje investigated how ingroup identifica350
Social identity and selftion affects fidelity to the group.
categorization perspectives suggest that fidelity to one’s group is determined by the group’s status, the need for esteem, and the objective
351
Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje proposed,
availability of alternatives.
however, that fidelity to one’s group was a function of psychological
commitment stemming from the importance of that particular group to
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342. Id. at 58.
343. Id.
344. Emanuele Castano et al., I Belong, Therefore, I Exist: Ingroup Identification, Ingroup Entitativity, and Ingroup Bias, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 135, 136–37
(2002).
345. Id. at 138–40.
346. Id. at 141.
347. Id. at 140.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Naomi Ellemers, Russell Spears & Bertjan Doosje, Sticking Together or Falling
Apart: In-Group Identification as a Psychological Determinant of Group Commitment Versus
Individual Mobility, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 617, 617 (1997).
351. Id. at 617–18.
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Id. at 619, 621.
Id. at 621.
Id.
Id. at 622.
Id. at 623.
Id. at 624.
Id. at 624–25.
Id. at 625.
Id.
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the member’s identity.
This perspective differed from previous research on individual mobility because it proposed that ingroup identification is a cause, rather a consequence, of one’s inclination to engage in
353
individual or intergroup behaviors.
Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje conducted two experiments designed
to test the effects of ingroup identification on perceived intragroup ho354
mogeneity, group commitment, and the desire for individual mobility.
In the first experiment, the participants were members of a low-status
ingroup, with either permeable (i.e., flexible group memberships) or im355
permeable boundaries (i.e., fixed group memberships). Low identifiers perceived the group as less homogenous, were less committed to the
group, and had more of a desire for individual mobility to the status
356
357
group. The exact opposite result was observed for high identifiers.
The second study investigated the minimal conditions that are need358
Thus, in this
ed for the emergence of ingroup identification effects.
condition, the relative status of the group was unknown to the partici359
pants. Results revealed that even in the absence of an identity threat,
low identifiers were less likely to see the group as homogenous, had less
commitment to the group, and had a stronger desire for individual mo360
bility than high identifiers. These results added further support to the
claim that the psychological factors, as opposed to the objective struc361
tural features, determine commitment to one’s group.
These results suggest that identification with the ingroup is a powerful determinant of the desire for individual social mobility, irrespective
362
of threats to one’s social identity. High identifiers see the group as a
homogenous unit and remain committed even when it would be person363
ally profitable to abandon the group.
Low identifiers, by contrast,
emphasize the differences of individual group members and, at best, ex-
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364. Id.
365. Naomi Ellemers et al., Self-Categorisation, Commitment to the Group and Group
Self-Esteem as Related but Distinct Aspects of Social Identity, 29 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 371,
371 (1999).
366. Id. at 372 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Henri Tajfel, Social Categorization, Social
Identity and Social Comparison, in DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN SOCIAL GROUPS 61, 63
(Henri Tajfel ed., 1978)).
367. Ellemers et al., supra note 365, at 372.
368. Id. at 373–75.
369. Id. at 377–78.
370. Id. at 380.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 380–81.
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hibit indifference to continued group membership under both threaten364
ing and more neutral (i.e., uncertain status) conditions.
In a 1999 article, Ellemers and colleagues analyzed and distinguished
365
the components of social identity. Social identity, as defined by Tajfel,
is “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his
knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together
with the value and emotional significance attached to that member366
ship.” According to Ellemers and colleagues, this definition suggests
that three separate components contribute to one’s social identity: “a
cognitive component (a cognitive awareness of one’s membership in a
social group—self-categorisation), an evaluative component (a positive
or negative value connotation attached to this group membership—
group self-esteem), and an emotional component (a sense of emotional
367
involvement with the group—affective commitment).”
Next, Ellemers and colleagues argued that each aspect of social identity is differentially affected by specific group characteristics or the social context, namely relative group size, relative group status, and
whether membership in the group was assigned as opposed to achieved
368
or self-selected. To test this assumption, they manipulated assignment
criteria (self-selected versus assigned), membership status (high versus
low), and the relative size (majority versus minority) of artificially creat369
ed groups.
Results confirmed that the evaluative component of social identity,
370
group self-esteem, is only affected by the relative status of the ingroup.
Self-categorization, the cognitive dimension of social identity, is solely
371
dependent upon the relative size of the ingroup. Members of minority
groups report both strong self-categorization as group members and
372
strong personal identification. Ellemers and colleagues explained that
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373. Id. at 385.
374. Id. (emphasis omitted).
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 383.
378. Id. at 384.
379. Jessica Milne & John Duckitt, A Multidimensional Approach to Organizational
Identification and Commitment, in PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY RESEARCH
173, 173 (Bettina P. Reimann ed., 2008).
380. Id. at 176–77.
381. Id. at 178.
382. Id. at 182.
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the fact that strong group identity can be observed even when the group
purportedly has low value connotation suggests that self-categorization
and group self-esteem are relatively independent and that group self373
esteem does not necessarily lead people to avoid self-categorization.
Finally, the data on affective commitment, “the emotional aspect of social identification,” showed that group commitment “depend[s] both on
the way groups have been formed and on the relative status of these
374
groups.” Commitment to the group was “enhanced when people have
self-selected their group membership, or when the group [has] relatively
375
high status.” According to Ellemers and colleagues, this result implies
that people may display strong commitment to a group with low status if
membership is self-selected or achieved, rather than imposed external376
ly.
Finally, Ellemers and colleagues argued that the three dimensions of
social identity play different roles as mediators of group level behav377
iors. As predicted, the data showed that the group commitment aspect
378
of social identity was the only predictor of ingroup favoritism.
Milne and Duckitt “investigated the dimensionality of organizational
identification . . . and attitudinal commitment, their interrelationship,
379
and their relationships with hypothesized causes and consequences.”
On the basis of previous empirical findings, Milne and Duckitt posited
that organizational identification and commitment are concepts that
380
overlap but are also separate and empirically distinguishable. Accordingly, their research was designed to determine the specific dimensions
that these concepts have in common and on which they may be dis381
tinct.
Results revealed six primary dimensions of organizational identification and commitment: ingroup affect, commitment, ingroup ties, percep382
tion of oneness, centrality, and personalization. The commitment fac-
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tor is predominately related to the construct of organizational commit383
ment.
The ingroup affect factor is a product of both organizational
384
The remaining four
commitment and organizational identification.
factors—ingroup ties, centrality, personalization, and perception of one385
ness—are products of organizational identification.
These findings
support the assumption that the primary difference between organizational identification and commitment is that in organizational identification individuals perceive “themselves in terms of their organizational
386
membership, while in commitment they do not.”
In the context of hazing, ingroup-outgroup dynamics may leave fraternity and sorority pledges feeling allied with each other and against
big brothers and big sisters. With such feelings may come a sense of betrayal for or against the pledge who abandons the pledge group even as
the hazing becomes increasingly risky for the pledges.
E. Need for Esteem
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383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 193.
387. Tom Pyszczynski et al., Why Do People Need Self-Esteem? A Theoretical and Empirical Review, 130 PSYCHOL. BULL. 435, 435, 438 (2004).
388. Id. at 436, 438.
389. Id. at 436–37.
390. Id.
391. Id. at 437.
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Pyszczynski and colleagues provided an exhaustive theoretical and
empirical review of research on why people need self-esteem and what
387
Pyszczynski and colleagues found
psychological function it serves.
widespread empirical support for the assumption that self-esteem serves
an anxiety-buffering function, thus supporting the tenets of Terror Management Theory (TMT) and its explanations of why people need self388
esteem. TMT posits, inter alia, that a person’s cultural worldview and
self-esteem both serve as an anxiety-buffering function in the human
389
predicament of existential terror. TMT defines self-esteem as a sense
of personal value that is obtained by believing in one’s worldview and
390
living up to the standards of value prescribed by one’s worldview.
TMT predicts that people try to defend their cultural worldview when
they are threatened by mortality concerns, particularly if their self391
esteem is low. Moreover, although much research has used reminders
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of mortality (i.e., mortality salience hypothesis) to document the terror
management function of self-esteem, such reminders need not be pre392
sent for people to pursue the protective functions of self-esteem.
Fuller and colleagues conducted an empirical analysis on why con393
strued external image is related to organizational identification. “Organizational identification is ‘a perceived oneness with an organization
and the experience of the organization’s successes and failures as one’s
394
“[O]rganizational identification occurs when an individual’s
own.’”
395
self-concept is tied to his or her organizational membership.” Several
antecedents of organizational identification have been identified, one of
396
which is construed external image.
Construed external image, also
known as perceived external prestige (PEP), “refers to a member’s be397
liefs about outsiders’ perceptions of the organization” and “summarizes a member’s beliefs about how people outside the organization are
likely to view the member through his or her organizational affilia398
tion.”
Fuller and colleagues investigated the theoretical explanation of the
positive relationship between construed external image and organizational identification and examined the extent to which the need for self399
esteem accounts for this relationship. Results confirmed the hypotheses (1) that an organizational member’s construed external image would
be positively related to the member’s organizational identification and
(2) that this relationship would be moderated by the member’s need for
400
self-esteem. Specifically, the data showed “no significant relationship
between construed external image and organizational identification for
individuals with low need for self-esteem,” whereas “for individuals with
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392. Id. at 437–39.
393. J. Bryan Fuller et al., Construed External Image and Organizational Identification:
A Test of the Moderating Influence of Need for Self-Esteem, 146 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 701, 701
(2006).
394. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Fred Mael & Blake E. Ashforth, Alumni and Their
Alma Mater: A Partial Test of the Reformulated Model of Organizational Identification, 13 J.
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 103, 103 (1992)).
395. Fuller et al., supra note 393, at 703 (citing Jane E. Dutton et al., Organizational Images and Member Identification, 39 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 239, 239 (1994)).
396. Fuller et al., supra note 393, at 702.
397. Id. at 702, 704 (quoting Dutton et al., supra note 395, at 248) (citing Ale Smidts et
al., The Impact of Employee Communication and Perceived External Prestige on Organizational Identification, 49 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1051, 1051 (2001)).
398. Fuller et al., supra note 393, at 704 (quoting Dutton et al., supra note 395, at 250).
399. Fuller et al., supra note 393, at 705.
400. Id. at 708, 710.
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a high need for self-esteem, the relationship [was] strongly positive.”
These results are consistent with Fuller and colleagues’ hypothesis that
“outsiders’ opinion of the organization is likely to strongly influence”
the self-concept of individuals with high need for self-esteem “because
their feelings of self-worth are strongly dependent on the attention and
positive evaluations of other people,” whereas individuals with a low
need for self-esteem “are not strongly motivated by the need for others
402
Fuller and colleagues explained that their
to view them positively.”
results “challenge the assumption in Social Identity Theory that all people share a similar need for self-esteem” and will accordingly seek to establish the positive distinctiveness of their groups in order to meet their
403
own needs for positive self-esteem.
F. Obedience to Authority
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401. Id. at 711–12.
402. Id. at 706.
403. Id. at 712–13.
404. See Thomas Blass, The Milgram Paradigm After 35 Years: Some Things We Now
Know About Obedience to Authority, 29 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 955, 969 (1999) (citing
Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 371,
373–74, 376 (1963)).
405. See John M. Darley, Constructive and Destructive Obedience: A Taxonomy of Principal-Agent Relationships, 51 J. SOC. ISSUES, no. 3, 1995 at 125, 125–26 (discussing the design
of Milgram’s experiment); Milgram, supra note 404, at 373–74.
406. Darley, supra note 405, at 126–27 (discussing the acceptance of Milgram’s findings
and empirical research generalizing the results to other “agentic situations”).
407. Id. at 133.
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In his 1963 study, Milgram found that sixty-five percent of participants were willing to obey authority and administer an electric shock to
a co-participant (hereinafter the “learner”) who failed to learn word
404
pairs, despite protests from the learner and indications that such
405
Milgram’s findings have gained widespread
shocks were dangerous.
acceptance within academia, so much so that some researchers contend
that Milgram’s findings can help explain the behaviors of others who
406
commit atrocities. Darley “violently object[s],” claiming that there are
important distinctions between the behaviors of subjects in the Milgram
situation and those who commit atrocities, such as the “Nazi doctors,
concentration camp executioners, or Serbian snipers who assassinate
407
children.” He explains that, unlike the former, the latter commit such
acts “without supervision of authorities, without external pressure, and
they use their intelligence to independently determine how they will do
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Id.
Id. at 135–36, 140 & tbl. 1.
See id. at 135–36, 138.
See id. at 142, 147.
Id. at 141–42, 145–47, 150.
Id. at 148.
Id. at 151.
Id.
See Philip G. Zimbardo, On “Obedience to Authority,” 29 AM. PSYCHOL. 566, 566
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(1974).
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so.” He further contends that the participants in the Milgram situation
who continued to administer shocks in accordance with the experimenter’s orders were not, phenomenologically, deciding to harm another
409
person. Instead, they found themselves torn between two incompati410
ble perspectives as to the meaning of continuing with the experiment.
Critical to this analysis is the construction of the participant’s meaning
of the experimenter’s behavior. Darley posits a taxonomy of situations
to categorize the behaviors of a person in authority, the principal, and
411
those of a subordinate, the agent, who acts on that authority. Relying
on the law of agency, Darley concludes that the responsibility for any
harm done in the Milgram situation rests entirely with the experimenter
412
as the principal.
Next, Darley conducted a Milgram-type study involving participants
who believed they were in a setting in which they would have to punish
413
Participants
someone, although no punishment actually took place.
were presented with information they believed the experimenter did not
have and in this circumstance chose what Darley calls “constructive
obedience,” in contrast to the destructive obedience of the Milgram
414
studies. Participants modified their proposed behavior in light of this
415
information while maintaining the overall aims of the experimenter.
According to Darley, this result suggests that Milgram’s data might be
read as implying the same sort of process in those conditions where Mil416
gram left the room. That is, participants might have thought that Milgram would have instructed them differently had he been able to hear
417
the learner’s cries.
In 1974, Philip Zimbardo wrote a short article contending that Milgram’s experiment provides powerful support for the idea that situational determinants, and not a person’s individual characteristics, de418
Commenting on Milgram’s research and his own
termine behavior.
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companion research on prison behavior, Zimbardo noted the three major research themes in each:
(a) [T]hat obedience to authority requires each of us to first
participate in the myth-making process of creating authority figures who then must legitimize their authority through the evidence of our submission and obedience to them;
(b) that the reason we can be manipulated so readily is precisely because we maintain an illusion of personal invulnerability
and personal control, all the time being insensitive to the power
of social forces and “discriminable” stimuli within the situation,
which are in fact the potent determinants of action; and
(c) that evil deeds are rarely the product of evil people acting
from evil motives, but are the product of good bureaucrats simp419
ly doing their job.
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419. Id.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Robert A. Lavine, Personality Traits Across Cultures and Research on Obedience,
64 AM. PSYCHOL. 620, 620 (2009).
423. Id.
424. Id.
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Zimbardo concluded that we must focus on acquiring more
knowledge about the social conditions that cause us to behave in ways
that contradict our morals and expectations and that we must “critically
reexamine the ethics and tactics of our revered social institutions, which
lay the foundation for our mindless obedience to rules, to expectations,
420
and to people playing at being authorities.”
As mentioned above, Zimbardo concluded that it is important to focus on the situational determinants that lead to the uncritical acceptance
421
of authority. Robert Lavine cautions, however, that the emphasis on
situational determinants of obedience to authority should not obscure
422
other factors that contribute to this phenomenon. Specifically, Lavine
contends that cultural and personality differences may influence obedience to authority, with the caveat that “such traits probably change over
time and generations, are subject to situational and historical variables,
423
and interact with individual differences.” Despite the potential interactive effects, Lavine contends that future researchers should develop
studies that take into account the potential impact of cultural factors on
424
obedience to authority.
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425. Abraham Carmeli, Perceived External Prestige, Affective Commitment, and Citizenship Behaviors, 26 ORG. STUD. 443, 443–44 (2005).
426. Id. at 444.
427. Id. at 446.
428. Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Blake E. Ashforth & Fred
Mael, Social Identity Theory and the Organization, 14 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 20, 21 (1989)) (citing Michael G. Pratt, To Be or Not to Be? Central Questions in Organizational Identification,
in IDENTITY IN ORGANIZATIONS: BUILDING THEORY THROUGH CONVERSATIONS 171, 172
(David A. Whetten & Paul C. Godfrey eds., 1998)).
429. Carmeli, supra note 425, at 446 (quoting John P. Meyer & Natalie J. Allen, Testing
the “Side-Bet Theory” of Organizational Commitment: Some Methodological Considerations,
69 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 372, 375 (1984)).
430. Carmeli, supra note 425, at 449–50.
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Carmeli’s study proposed and tested a model which links two forms
of perceived organizational prestige with employee affective commit425
ment and organizational citizenship behaviors.
Organizational prestige refers to an “employee’s own beliefs about how other people outside the organization . . . evaluate the status and prestige of the
426
Carmeli identified two forms of perceived organizaorganization.”
tional prestige: “[S]ocial prestige, covering (1) quality of management,
(2) quality of products or services, (3) ability to attract, develop, and retain talented people, (4) community and environmental responsibility,
and (5) innovativeness; and economic prestige, covering (1) financial
soundness, (2) long-term investment value, and (3) use of organization
427
assets.”
Next, Carmeli examined organizational identification. Organizational identification is the “‘perception of oneness with or belongingness
to some human aggregat[ion].’ It occurs when one integrates beliefs
428
Carmeli measured orabout one’s organization into one’s identity.”
ganizational identification in terms of affective commitment, which refers to “positive feelings of identification with, attachment to, and in429
volvement in, the work organization.”
Carmeli put forth three hypotheses: (1) “Both perceived external
economic prestige and perceived external social prestige augment employees’ affective commitment to their organization, but perceived external social prestige will have a larger impact”; (2) “[p]erceived external economic prestige and perceived external social prestige will have
positive interactive effects on employees’ affective commitment to their
organization”; and (3) the relationship between both forms of PEP and
430
citizenship behaviors would be mediated by affective commitment.
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431. Id. at 453, 454 tbl.1.
432. Id. at 455, 459.
433. Id. at 459–60.
434. Id. at 456.
435. Id. at 459.
436. Id. at 460.
437. Abraham Carmeli et al., Perceived External Prestige, Organizational Identification
and Affective Commitment: A Stakeholder Approach, 9 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 92, 93
(2006).
438. See id. at 93.
439. See id. at 92, 95, 101–02.
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The results revealed that both forms of PEP affect employees’ affective commitment to their organization, though perceived external social
431
prestige may have a larger effect, confirming the first hypothesis.
However, the findings failed to support the second hypothesis that both
forms of PEP would produce a positive interactive effect on affective
432
Carmeli noted that the data on the second hypothesis
commitment.
contradicts previous research and may be due to the nature of the setting in which the sampled employees worked (social workers in health
433
Finally, “the mediating hypothesis was supported
care institutions).
only for the relationship between perceived external social prestige and
434
altruism.”
Carmeli explained that these results may suggest that organizations
435
may be perceived as prestigious but not in all aspects of the definition.
Carmeli interpreted the results as providing support for the more general hypothesis that when members believe that outsiders have positive
perceptions of their organization, they identify more with the organization, and this increased identification is translated into altruistic behav436
ior.
Carmeli and colleagues adopted a stakeholder approach to assess
the impact of PEP on organizational members’ cognitive identification
437
and affective commitment. Stakeholder theory holds that the organization should be analyzed from the perspective of the organization’s key
interest constituents because they affect, and are affected by, the behav438
iors of the organization. Applying that theory to the study by Carmeli
and colleagues involved an evaluation of whether an employee’s personal assessment of how outsiders view the organization fosters cognitive identification and whether such identification ultimately influences
439
an employee’s affective commitment.
Cognitive identification refers to the “perception that one shares[]
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440. Id. at 94 (alteration in original) (quoting Fred A. Mael & Lois E. Tetrick, Identifying Organizational Identification, 52 EDUC. & PSYCHOL. MEASUREMENT 813, 816 (1992)).
441. Carmeli et al., supra note 437, at 94 (quoting Meyer & Allen, supra note 429, at
375).
442. Carmeli et al., supra note 437, at 102.
443. Id.
444. Id. at 95.
445. Id.
446. Id. at 97, 98 tbl.2.
447. Id. at 102.
448. Id.
449. Id.
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the experiences, successes[,] and failures of the focal organization, and
that these successes and failures apply to and reflect upon the self just as
440
they reflect upon the organization.” Affective commitment refers to
the “positive feelings of identification with, attachment to, and involve441
ment in, the work organization.”
Carmeli and colleagues examined
442
The love
two components of affective commitment: love and joy.
component is concerned with the member’s “emotional attraction or affection toward the organization as a social category,” while the joy component refers to the happiness that arises from the organization as a so443
cial category.
Carmeli and colleagues hypothesized that “[PEP] among competitors, customers and suppliers is positively related [to cognitive] organizational identification,” and that “[c]ognitive organizational identification mediates the relationship between [PEP] and affective
444
These hypotheses were tested on a sample of Israeli
commitment.”
employees who work for four organizations in the electronics and media
445
industries.
Results showed that high PEP (of competitors, customers, and suppliers) causes employees to develop a higher level of cognitive organiza446
tional identification, confirming the first hypothesis. The data on the
differences among the three groups of stakeholders was non-significant
447
for the first hypothesis.
The second hypothesis was also confirmed,
but differential effects were observed among the three groups with re448
spect to the two forms of affective commitment.
On the affective
commitment-love measure, it was found that employees “who construe
the prestige that the competitors and suppliers attribute to their organization as favorable” they report greater love for the organization as a
449
social category. No significant effects were observed for customers on
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450

this measure. On the affective commitment-joy measure, it was found
that when employees “construe the prestige that the competitors and
customers attribute to their organization as favorable” report a greater
451
sense of happiness arising from the organization as a social category.
452
No significant relation was observed for suppliers on this measure.
With respect to the claim about the meditating role of cognitive organizational identification, the researchers found support for the assumption
that cognitive organizational identification mediates “the relationship
between both PEP (competitors) and PEP (suppliers) and affective
453
commitment.”
On the whole, the data suggest that employees attribute consistent
care and attention to all reference groups with respect to cognitive organizational identification, but that employees view some stakeholders
as more critical to the organization than others with respect to the two
454
forms of affective commitment.
Carmeli and Freund developed and tested a model that explores
how perceived organizational prestige influences job satisfaction, affective commitment, and turnover intentions among Israeli social workers
455
in the nonprofit sector.
Results of two separate studies showed that
high levels of perceived organizational prestige cause employees to de456
velop high levels of commitment and satisfaction and lower levels of
457
This finding is consistent with
intention to leave the organization.
previous research (such as that discussed above) and further validates
the relationship between organizational image and organizational at458
tachment.

Symbolic interactionist theory is based in part on the assumption
that it is through processing interactions with external objects and other
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450. Id.
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. Id. at 101–02.
454. Id. at 102–03.
455. Abraham Carmeli & Anat Freund, Linking Perceived External Prestige and Intentions to Leave the Organization: The Mediating Role of Job Satisfaction and Affective Commitment, 35 J. SOC. SERVICE RES. 236, 237, 247 (2009).
456. Id. at 242, 245, 247.
457. Id. at 242–43, 245–46.
458. Id. at 247.
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459. Stephen Sweet, Understanding Fraternity Hazing: Insights from Symbolic Interactionist Theory, 40 J. C. STUDENT DEV. 355, 358 (1999).
460. See id.
461. Id. at 359 (citing CHARLES HORTON COOLEY, HUMAN NATURE AND THE SOCIAL
ORDER (1970)).
462. Sweet, supra note 459, at 359.
463. See id.
464. Id. at 359, 361–62 (discussing the theories of role taking and reference groups and
applying those theories to hazing).
465. Id. at 361.
466. See id. at 358.
467. Id.
468. Id.
469. Id.
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people that individuals develop their sense of self and their understand459
ing of the world. Accordingly, how a person understands others, how
others come to understand that person, and how a person comes to understand and identify himself or herself are part of the symbolic interac460
tion process. Charles Cooley explained this phenomenon in terms of a
looking glass metaphor, in which we each undergo a similar process to
461
develop a unique self. That is, the sense of self that we each develop is
462
shaped by our interactions with people significant to us. What is different, however, is the group of people we each consider to be signifi463
cant. In the context of pledging, the identity of aspirants is influenced
because members isolate aspirants from their other significant social
groups, thereby causing aspirants to ascribe more significance to the fra464
The ultimate implication is
ternity as the relevant reference group.
that aspirants come to view the fraternity as the reference group from
465
which they must gain social approval.
Another important assumption of symbolic interactionist theory
concerns the role that perception and meaning play in an individual’s
466
significant interactions. Symbolic interactionism rests on three premises. The first is that individuals “act toward things on the basis of the
467
meanings these things have for them.” The second premise is that the
meaning of these things is derived from or arises out of the social inter468
action that one has with one’s social counterparts. The third premise
is that these meanings are handled and modified through an interpretive
process used by the person in dealing with the things he or she encoun469
ters.
Applying Blumer’s premises, Sweet contends that “hazing is not
simply the result of psychologically or morally flawed individuals; but is
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the result of a confluence of symbols, manipulated identities, and definitions of situations that are organized in the context of fraternity initia470
tion rites.” Sweet concludes that in order to understand why aspirants
consent to hazing, one must first understand the subcultural factors that
471
affect their perceptions of hazing situations.
Such an understanding,
Sweet suggests, will allow one to shape decisions about one’s conduct in
472
the face of hazing situations.
Jones and Volpe examined organizational identification from the
473
perspective of a symbolic interaction theory.
Symbolic interaction
theory emphasizes the importance of social relations in organizational
474
identification. Thus, Jones and Volpe examined the influence of social
475
To do so, they
networks on organizational identification processes.
examined the interactive effects of two categorical antecedents of organizational identification—organizational distinctiveness and organiza476
tional prestige —and the general antecedents of social networks (net477
work size, network density, and relationship strength).
Results showed that both organizational distinctiveness and “organizationally affiliated network size positively influenced the strength of
individuals’ organizational identification by promoting communication
with others” as a way of strengthening commitment to and identification
478
Results further indicated that “relationship
with the organization.
strength amplified the effect of organizational prestige on organizational
identification,” but that “organizational prestige had no direct effect on
479
organizational identification for this sample.” These results highlight
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470. Id. at 358, 362 (citing HERBERT BLUMER, SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM:
PERSPECTIVE AND METHOD (1969)).
471. See Sweet, supra 459, at 363.
472. Id.
473. See Candace Jones & Elizabeth Hamilton Volpe, Organizational Identification: Extending Our Understanding of Social Identities Through Social Networks, 32 J.
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 413, 413–14 (2011).
474. Id. at 413. Symbolic interaction theory can be contrasted with social identity theory, which focuses on the categorization and comparison processes that inform an individual’s
perception of the organization and ultimately stimulate identification with the organization.
See id. at 414.
475. Id.
476. Id. at 415–16.
477. Id. at 416–17.
478. Id. at 425 (citing Michael Humphreys & Andrew D. Brown, Narratives of Organizational Identity and Identification: A Case Study of Hegemony and Resistance, 23 ORG. STUD.
421, 439 (2002)).
479. Id.
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the type and structure of specific relationships that influence an individual’s organizational identification and ultimately suggest that introducing a social network perspective allows researchers to “better under480
stand and predict organizational identification.”
IV. CONCLUSION
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480. Id.
481. Swift v. Seidler (In re Swift), 198 B.R. 927, 939 n.11 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1996).
482. Yost v. Wabash Coll., 976 N.E.2d 724, 735 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
483. Quinn v. Sigma Rho Chapter of Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 507 N.E.2d 1193, 1197
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
484. Nisbet v. Bucher, 949 S.W.2d 111, 116 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
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“It would seem that the old saw about what happens when you ‘as481
sume’ proves again to be quite accurate.” The existence of consent or
lack thereof, whether we think about it from the statutory or common
law approach, appears to be imbued with a bit of armchair theorizing.
There seems to be an assumption that hazing “victims” either can or
cannot consent to their ordeal without truly reconciling that assessment
with what social science—the study of human behavior—might have to
482
say. In Yost, the court assumed that the plaintiff was not coerced. In
Quinn, the court found the opposite, suggesting that the social pressure
that exists within Greek-letter organization pledging culture to comply
483
In Nisbet, the
with initiation procedures is nearly insurmountable.
court noted that while the decedent could have walked away, the social
484
pressure to join blinded him to the dangers he faced. Each of these
cases, and the other examples of fraternity hazing may have come to the
right conclusion. They, however, appear to leap over what a deeper understanding of the social science might say about hazing consent.
A fraternity or sorority pledge may begin a pledge process, and once
they start down the path of being hazed, not realize the stakes associated with the activity. These pledges may believe that there are not adequate opportunities to quit and may not know enough about the organization or the pledge experience to properly evaluate the consequences
of persisting or quitting. As such, pledges may perceive that if they stick
it out for another day and another day and yet another day, they will finally be members. But, often, those days may turn into weeks or
months of hazing. Such thinking may be particularly pronounced in
groups, like pledge classes, where the individual’s identity is submerged
for the sake of the group’s identity and where group members are
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stressed and hampered in their ability to critically evaluate the situation
in which they find themselves. Even more, the hostile environment that
big brothers or sisters may create for a pledge class may forge a bond
between those pledges as a cohesive group in contrast to the big brothers or sisters. Such a bond may be difficult for pledge class members to
terminate even for their own self-preservation. And in these contexts
where big brothers or sisters exert their authority, pledges may willingly
submit to that authority even if being hazed. Where the fraternity or sorority is of high prestige, either on the pledge’s respective campus or in
society more widely, the pledge may be driven to tolerate being hazed to
be a part of such an organization in and of itself but also as a means to
enhance his or her own self-esteem. In the end, the pledges may come
to gain a deeper understanding of themselves during the pledge process
and be unwilling to relinquish that understanding.
While all of this may be true, it is still not universal. For example, a
fraternity pledge may come from a long-line of fraternity men or have
had a mentor who was a fraternity man. The pledge may have heard
“war stories” about what it was like to be on-line. Before seeking fraternity membership, the pledge may have done his homework on fraternity-life and been apprised of what hazing is like. The fraternity may
have provided a deep and meaningful education to the pledge on the
dangers of hazing—informing him of hazing injuries and deaths with
some specificity. A pledge may not “buy into” the notion of submerging
the “I” for the sake of the “we.” As such, a pledge may not be interested in the goal of the group—completing the pledge process—vis-à-vis
the pledge’s own interest of self-preservation. A pledge may not readily
submit to authority or only do so when he perceives the hazing to be
mild. A pledge may be interested in joining a fraternity but not perceive
the organization as being particularly prestigious, and thus his esteem
may not be enhanced by membership. Even more, pledges may feel as
though they gain little insight into who they are as a result of the pledge
process. Courts and legislatures should be mindful of these and other
factors and evaluate hazing consent on a case-by-case basis.
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